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Dissertation
ABSTRACT
The importance of private firms in the economy has been established, especially
in Europe. The financial statements of private firms are the subject of interest for
many stakeholders, such as owners, creditors, suppliers, employees, and
governments. However, the extant research explaining earnings management is
mostly limited to the environment of public firms, in which the role of financial
reporting is more about communication with outside investors compared to
private firms.
This dissertation takes advantage of the multiple institutional environments
within  the  European  Union,  with  a  focus  on  Finland,  for  the  purpose  of
enhancing our understanding of earnings management in private firms. The
dissertation provides evidence regarding high versus low tax alignments and
auditor gender as factors restricting the earnings management of private firms
on a wide scale. In addition, the dissertation provides evidence regarding the
resource allocation effects of dividend tax rate changes in Finland via earnings
management.
The results may be beneficial for stakeholders in private firms and regulators.
The results suggest that a lower, i.e., fixed, dividend tax rate would better serve
the owners’ and financial statement users’ interests in Finland, in which a dual
tax system is now partially applied. In addition, the results can be applied to the
recent  regulative  debate  in  the  US  concerning  book-tax  conformities  by
suggesting that tax alignment, as an institutional factor, shapes the reporting
demands of shareholders regarding tax-induced reporting conservatism. In
addition, the results may have practical relevance regarding the differences in
earnings quality between female- and male-audited private firms.
Keywords: earnings management, private firms
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Väitöskirja
ABSTRAKTI
Yksityisten yritysten rooli taloudessa, erityisesti Euroopassa, on merkittävä.
Yksityisten yritysten tilinpäätöksistä ovat kiinnostuneita eri sidosryhmät kuten
omistajat, velkojat, tavarantoimittajat, työntekijät ja valtiovalta. Olemassa oleva
tuloksenohjausta käsittelevä tutkimuskirjallisuus on keskittynyt pääosin
pörssilistattuihin yrityksiin Yhdysvalloissa, mikä tutkimusympäristönä
poikkeaa merkittävästi yksityisten yritysten tutkimusympäristöstä.
Käyttämällä tutkimusaineistona Euroopan Unionin jäsenmaissa, erityisesti
Suomessa toimivia yksityisiä yrityksiä, tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on lisätä
ymmärrystä tuloksenohjauksesta sitä laaja-alaisesti rajoittavien tekijöiden kuten
alhainen ja korkea tilinpäätösraportoinnin verosidonnaisuus sekä
tilintarkastajan sukupuoli yksilönäkökulmasta, osalta. Lisäksi väitöskirja tarjoaa
evidenssiä osinkoveromuutoksen resurssiallokaatiovaikutuksesta Suomessa
tuloksenohjauksen kautta.
Väitöstutkimuksen tuloksista on hyötyä sidosryhmille ja lainsäätäjille.
Väitöstutkimuksen tulokset ehdottavat, että alhaisempi, esim. kiinteä,
osinkoveroaste palvelisi paremmin omistajien ja tilinpäätöksen käyttäjien
intressejä Suomessa, missä kahdenkertainen verojärjestelmä on nykyisin
käytössä. Tulokset ottavat kantaa myös viimeaikaiseen tutkimuskeskusteluun
Yhdysvalloissa ehdottamalla, että korkea tilinpäätösraportoinnin
verosidonnaisuus lisää omistajien vero-ohjautuvan konservatiivisuuden
kysyntää. Lisäksi väitöstutkimuksen tuloksilla saattaisi olla käytännön
relevanssia arvioitaessa tilinpäätöksen osoittaman tuloksen laadukkuutta mies-
ja naistilintarkastettujen yksityisten yritysten välillä.
Asiasanat: tuloksenohjaus, yksityiset yritykset
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1 Introduction
1.1 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
Private firms play an important role in the global economy, i.e.,  contributing to
employment, innovation, and entrepreneurship. The majority of firms operating
in the European Union are privately held. In addition, about 99% of companies
that  operate  in  Europe  are  small  or  medium-sized.  The  extant  empirical
literature  on  earnings  management  over  the  last  four  decades  has  focused  on
large public corporations in the United States. Thus, the research is limited to an
environment  in  which  information  asymmetry  between  insiders  (such  as
managers)  and outside investors  in  firms is  mitigated through the provision of
more  timely  accounting  information  and  financial  disclosure  than  that  seen  in
private  firms.  (Note  an  earlier  research  project  by  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  in
connection  with  this  subject).  Less  is  known  about  earnings  management  in
private firms. According to Healy and Wahlen’s (1999, 368) definition, “earnings
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”
Thus, in its wider meaning, earnings management refers to accrual-based
accounting policy choices, as well as non-accrual-based earnings management
via  real  activities,  such  as  timing  and  amount  of  costs  and  revenues
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Scott, 2009).
Information asymmetry, namely ‘adverse selection,’ arises because the firm
manager, as an insider, knows more about the firm’s financial performance than
its outsiders. As investors perceive current earnings as better predictors of
future cash flows than current cash flows (Dechow, 1994), managers may also
use accounting judgment to make accounting information more useful to
investors. These arguments are based on the assumption that investors partially
‘see through’ earnings management, especially in public firms. However, using
accounting judgment to provide more credible information to outside
stakeholders does not fall within Healy and Wahlen’s (1999) definition of
earnings management.
Auditors have a special role in convincing the investors of a firm, the state
and municipal authorities, and other audiences that financial statements are free
of managerial misstatements (i.e., fraud). Thus, auditing, although incomplete,
mitigates information asymmetries and agency costs in firms (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).
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This dissertation takes advantage of the research context of private firms,
particularly  in  13  European  Union  member  states,  with  a  focus  on  Finland.  In
private  firms,  ownership  is  more  concentrated  among  insiders,  such  as
managers and directors, than in public firms. Therefore, the incentives of owners
and managers are more aligned in this context. In private firms, non-managing
owners, who are typically insiders such as members of the board of directors
and relatives, presumably demand less timely information regarding economic
losses when communicating with firm managers (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). On
the  other  hand,  lenders,  such  as  banks,  may  be  important  outside  investors  in
private  firms,  which  most  often  rely  on  bank-based  debt  financing  sources.
Investors, such as lenders, may face greater information asymmetries in private
firms because these firms disclose less non-accounting information, and the
accounting information they disclose is less timely than that disclosed by public
firms  (i.e.,  annual  versus  interim  reports).  In  contrast  to  this  view,  the  prior
literature suggests that investors in private firms rely less on earnings-based
heuristics when evaluating private firm performance than when evaluating
public firm performance (Mills & Newberry, 2001; Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 2002).
These arguments are based on the idea that private firm stakeholders have
‘insider access’ to information, much like stakeholders in code-law
environments (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000). The prior
literature also suggests that the accounting policy choices of private firms may
be  more  affected  by  internal  incentives,  such  as  contracts,  because  investors  in
these firms demand less timely information than investors in public companies
(Beatty & Harris, 1999; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz,
2006). Nevertheless, some studies suggest that external reporting demands may
explain earnings management in private firms as well (Coppens & Peek, 2005;
Peek, Cuijpers, & Buijink, 2010). In contrast to prior studies, Sundgren (2007)
shows that there are no differences in accounting choices/earnings management
between private and public Finnish firms. The mixed findings on the role of
earnings management in private firms warrant further research.
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION
Using  the  research  context  of  private  firms,  with  a  focus  on  the  Finnish
institutional environment, the objective of this dissertation is to enhance our
understanding of earnings management in private firms. To achieve this
objective, the dissertation is comprised of four related essays. The research
questions posed in the individual essays are as follows:
(1) Are the earnings of private firms managed more for tax reasons in
high tax alignment environments than in low tax alignment
environments based on conditional conservatism?
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(2)  Are  earnings  managed  to  avoid  corporate  tax  or  owners’  tax  when
incentives compete in private firms?
(3) Does the auditor’s gender affect the ability of private firms to manage
their earnings? Are there differences in earnings management between
male- and female-audited firms?
(4) Does the auditor’s gender affect the ability of private firms to manage
their  earnings  on  a  cosmetic  level?  Are  there  differences  in  cosmetic
earnings management between male- and female-audited firms?
The  first,  third,  and  fourth  research  questions  enhance  our  understanding  of
factors  that  limit  the  scope  of  earnings  management.  The  second  research
question  enhances  our  understanding  of  the  resource  allocation  effects  of
dividend tax rate changes via earnings management. Focusing on conditional
conservatism (first) and earnings cosmetics (fourth), the first and fourth essays
also engage in the discussion regarding income smoothing and signaling in
private firms.
The rest of the dissertation follows the following structure: Section 1.3
reviews the theoretical background related to the essays in the dissertation.
Section 2 summarizes the individual essays, which are presented in their
original  form  at  the  end  of  the  dissertation.  This  section  also  presents  the
contributions of the results of the individual essays. Finally, Section 3 discusses
the results of the individual essays, presents the joint contribution of these
results, and introduces the practical implications arising from them.
1.3 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND PRIVATE FIRMS
Healy and Wahlen (1999) emphasize two distinct roles of earnings management:
signaling- and contractual-based. From a signaling perspective, the early
empirical  literature  concentrates  on  the  income  smoothing  type  of  earnings
management,  by  which  firms  attempt  to  give  stakeholders  the  impression  that
they are low-risk firms (Beidleman, 1973; Ronen & Sadan, 1981). The concept of
accounting conservatism becomes important in differentiating the income
smoothing opportunities of firms. Conditional conservatism, as one dimension
of overall accounting conservatism, generates earnings that reflect ‘bad news’ in
a timelier manner than ‘good news’ due to the existence of greater verification
requirements for the recognition of economic gains than the recognition of
economic losses (Basu, 1997). This US-style income statement conservatism
increases the volatility of the reported income because it recognizes economic
losses in a timelier manner than gains. As stated in literature:
The primary accounting tool available to reduce earnings volatility is to fail to
recognize economic gains and losses in a timely fashion; that is, to base earnings more
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on current-period realizations of cash flows, and less on accounting accruals that
capitalize changes in present values of future cash flows. Reported earnings then is a
smoothed  moving  average  of  past  economic  income,  and  thus  is  less  timely  in
incorporating information about the economic value of the firm. (Ball 2004, 125)
Balance sheet conservatism, or unconditional conservatism (Beaver & Ryan,
2005),  which  is  in  contrast  to  income  statement  conservatism,  allows  firms  to
undervalue  the  book  value  of  equity,  i.e.,  through  hidden  reserves,  and
overwrite the book value of liabilities, including the understatement of earnings
in favourable circumstances. Therefore, it enables companies to report smoother
earnings, i.e., for stable dividend, bonus or tax payments, or hide losses to signal
better performance to the stakeholders (Ball, 2004). Since unconditional
conservatism produces a persistent understatement of net assets, García Lara,
García Osma, and Penalva (2009) suggest that unconditional conservatism as a
long run accounting policy is less flexible in shifting income across periods from
an earnings management perspective than conditional conservatism. Unlike
unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism allows large temporary
negative shocks on earnings either through timelier recognition of current
economic  losses  or  delays  of  current  economic  gains,  and  is  therefore  more
efficient in altering current earnings numbers. The discretionary accruals refers
to earnings management in a ‘hard-to-detect’ manner, and may take the form of
increases in amortization charges, excessive liabilities for product guarantees,
contingencies,  and  rebates,  or  generous  provisions  for  doubtful  accounts,  and
obsolescence of inventories (Scott, 2009). DeFond and Park (2001) pointed out
that  especially  discretionary  accruals  are  subject  to  reversal.  This  means  that
current  earnings  management  based  on  discretionary  accruals  will  take  an
opposite effect on income in the subsequent periods.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examined the cross-sectional distributions of
net earnings and net earnings changes and found that corporate loss avoidance
in income smoothing is a relatively common phenomenon in public firms.
Specifically, they perceived the discontinuity at zero in the distribution of both
indicators. Coppens and Peek (2005) extended the research of Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) on European private and public firms, and found that certain
private firms avoid losses in a similar manner to public firms. Moreira (2006)
showed that loss avoidance is more important for private firms with high
financing needs. A growing body of research focuses on capital market
pressures and institutional differences related to investor protection as factors
inducing more credible accounting-based signaling (i.e., conditional
conservatism) among firms (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Leuz, Dhananjay, &
Wysocki, 2003; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006; Peek,
Cuijpers, & Buijink, 2010). Recently, Peek et al. (2010) showed that more
conditional conservatism is induced by creditors with strong national creditor
protection, but not by well-protected shareholders in private firms. These results
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suggest that the shareholders and creditors have differential accounting
information  needs  regarding  the  timely  recognition  of  economic  gains  and
losses.
A more direct measure used to identify signaling directed at outside
stakeholders of firms is cosmetic earnings management, by which firms attempt
to give stakeholders an impression about better underlying economic
performance using a small upward rounding of the net income number. Later
studies  based  on  Carslaw’s  (1988)  theory  show  that  cosmetic  earnings
management is a common phenomenon among public corporations worldwide
(Thomas, 1989; Van Caneghen, 2002; Niskanen & Keloharju, 2000; Kinnunen &
Koskela, 2003). Less is known about earnings cosmetics among private firms.
Contracts that are explicitly or implicitly connected to the accounting
numbers of firms provide another incentive to manage (i.e., smooth) the
earnings of firms. Typical explicit contracts include managerial bonuses
(DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994), debt covenants (Healy, 1985; Dichev & Skinner,
2002), and taxation (Guenther, 1994). Typical implicit contracts include
management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1986) and labour union contract negotiations
(Liberty & Zimmerman, 1986). From a contracting perspective, positive
accounting theory states that a manager may act either in his or her own self-
interest (i.e., increasing his/her job security or smooth compensation) or on
behalf of owners during accounting policy choices (Watts & Zimmermann,
1986). Positive accounting theory is based on the existence of agency costs that
arise from the conflict of interests between the principal and the agent that has
been engaged to act on behalf of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As the
principal  is  unable  to  observe  the  agent’s  efforts,  the  agent  may  have  some
incentive  to  shirk.  This  kind  of  behavior  is  referred  to  as  a  ‘moral  hazard.’
Another typical principal-agent relationship, in which creditors are the principal
and owners  are  the agent,  arises  when a  firm finances  its  operations with debt
capital.
Accounting information serves as a monitoring and regulating tool for many
of a firm’s contracts, which are tied up with the accounting numbers. Based on
the agreement between the owners (as the principal) and the manager (as the
agent), one solution for the moral hazard problem is to tie the manager’s
compensation to the firm’s net income. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Healy
(1985) provide evidence of earnings management based on bonus schemes.
Dividend policy decisions, which are especially relevant for shareholders, are
based on cumulated net earnings; therefore, they are considered to be
dependent  on  the  accounting  policy  choices  of  a  firm.  As  owners  and  lenders
have asymmetric pay-offs, lenders may want to restrict the borrower’s actions,
i.e., excessive risk-taking or dividends, via debt covenants that are linked to the
accounting numbers of the borrower. Accounting conservatism may benefit the
debt contracts because it increases the likelihood of technical default and
restricts excessive dividends on the part of the borrower (Ahmed, Billings,
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Morton, & Stanford-Harris, 2002; Watts, 2003a). If technical default occurs, the
lender  has  an  opportunity  to  change  the  terms  of  a  loan  or  even  cancel  it.
Ahmed et al. (2002) suggest that if a firm is simultaneously subject to dividends,
operational risk, and leverage, the agency costs of debt are mitigated through
more conservative accounting.  A growing body of  research focuses  on the role
of accounting conservatism in strengthening corporate governance structures,
such as board monitoring in public firms (Watts, 2003b; Beekes, Pope, & Young,
2004; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Lafond & Roychowdhury, 2008). Accounting
policy choices that minimize costs, such as taxes, are considered to be contract-
efficient from a shareholder point of view.
Corporate and dividend tax-induced earnings management
Taxation, as an explicit contract between owners and the government, may
become relevant for earnings management because accounting policy choices
affect the taxable income of firms. Tax incentives for earnings management have
been  widely  studied  among  public  corporations  in  the  US,  i.e.,  in  terms  of
corporate tax rate changes (Scholes, Wilson, & Wolfson, 1992; Guenther, 1994;
Lopez, Regier, & Lee, 1998), net operating losses (Maydew, 1997), depreciation
policies (Keating & Zimmerman, 1999), deferred tax expenses (Phillips, Pincus,
& Rego, 2003), and permanently reinvested foreign earnings (Krull, 2004). In
addition, a growing body of research focuses on the connection between
financial reporting and tax accounting in these firms (Guenther, Maydew, &
Nutter,  1997;  Hanlon,  2005;  Badertscher,  Phillips,  Pincus,  &  Rego,  2009;  Frank,
Lynch,  &  Rego,  2009;  Blaylock,  Shevlin,  &  Wilson,  2012).  Mills  and  Newberry
(2001) suggest that book-tax differences become less relevant indicators of
aggressive tax positions for private firms because investors in these firms rely
less on earnings-based heuristics in evaluating firm performance than in public
firms.  However,  the  empirical  literature  on  tax  incentives  at  the  corporate  and
dividend levels and earnings management in private firms remains scarce.
The  degree  of  alignment  between  firms’  financial  and  tax  accounting
provides an institutional perspective on tax-induced earnings management. The
link  between  a  firm’s  taxes  and  its  reported  net  earnings  is  strong  in  most
European countries, including Finland (high tax alignment countries). In low tax
alignment countries, such as the US and the UK, firms have more opportunities
to  use  financial  accounting  for  reporting  purposes,  i.e.,  signaling  or  contracts
other than tax, irrespective of corporate tax accounting. This is because firms in
these countries typically operate in common law and use two parallel systems
for calculating income for financial reporting (e.g., US GAAP) and taxable
income  under  public  sector  rules  (e.g.,  the  US  Tax  Code  and  IRS  regulations)
(Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001; Ball, 2004; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). This is in
contrast to high tax alignment countries, in which accounting regarding the net
income of firms is almost identical to accounting regarding income used for tax
reporting.  Prior  studies  show  that  strong  versus  weak  tax  alignment  makes  a
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difference in the earnings management of private firms (Coppens & Peek, 2005;
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006; Van Tendeloo &
Vanstraelen, 2008). These studies implicitly provide a tax-reporting-based
explanation for these observations. Kasanen, Kinnunen, and Niskanen (1996)
show that public firms in Finland (a high tax alignment country) manage to
have more earnings meet target dividend levels simultaneously because they
minimize corporate tax. Watts (2003a) pointed out that accounting conservatism
reduces the present value of corporate tax, and therefore, it may be valuable to
owners. Since conditional conservatism allows temporary significant earnings
decreases and shifting income across periods, García Lara et al. (2009) suggest
that conditional conservatism is a more effective accounting policy than
unconditional conservatism regarding accounting responses to the differences in
marginal tax rates, which may affect the tax-induced reporting of firms. Less is
known about the conditional conservatism and tax-induced reporting of private
firms in high tax alignment environments.
From an explicit contracting perspective, the dividend taxation may become
relevant  if  the  firm  operates  in  an  environment  with  a  dual  taxation  system.
Under  this  system,  owners  are  obligated  to  pay  taxes  from  their  dividends  in
addition to corporate tax. A dual taxation system is commonly used in many
countries, including Finland.
Tax  rate  changes  may  provide  firms  with  an  incentive  to  temporarily  defer
earnings for tax reporting purposes. Scholes et al. (1992) and Guenther (1994)
show that  prior  to  the effective date  of  the US Tax Reform Act  of  1986,  public
firms deferred income in response to  reductions in  the corporate  tax rate.  The
Finnish tax reform of 2005 reduced the corporate tax rate from 28% to 26% at the
beginning of 2005. Concurrently, the owners’ taxation was tightened because the
full imputation system of corporate tax was gradually abandoned during the
period 2005–2006. Prior studies of the Finnish tax reform of 2005 show that
private firms adjusted their dividend policies in response to the tax reform with
the aim of benefiting from the lower dividend tax rate (Kari, Karikallio, &
Pirttilä, 2008, 2009; Harju & Matikka, 2013). Harju and Matikka (2013) showed
that owners of private firms shifted their personal income from dividends to
salaries  after  the  tax  reform.  These  results  imply  that  private  firm  owners  are
less dependent on smooth dividend-based income. Such income-shifting
behavior is less frequently available to shareholders in public firms.
Gender, auditors, and earnings management
Prior literature brings out the differences between females and males regarding
risk attitudes, overconfidence (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Jianakoplos &
Bernasek, 1998; Schubert, 2006; Olsen & Cox, 2001), ethical behavior, and moral
reasoning  abilities  (Betz,  O’Connell,  &  Shepard,  1989;  Ruegger  &  King,  1992;
Ford & Richardson, 1994; Khazanchi, 1995; Eynon, Hill, & Stevens, 1997;
Bernardi & Arnold, 1997). These studies are mostly based on experimental
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behavioral studies conducted for students and professionals, as well as real
business decision-making. Collectively, the prior studies suggest that females
are more risk-averse and capable of thinking more ethically than males.
However,  these  results  may  not  apply  to  top  executives  (Johnson  &  Powell,
1994) or in certain cultural environments (Roxas & Stoneback, 2004).
With  respect  to  prior  evidence  on  gender  and  behavior,  it  is  possible  that
gender affects the earnings management of firms. Based on this rationale, some
studies have investigated the connection between managers’ and directors’
gender and earnings management in public corporations (Gul, Srinidri, & Tsui,
2007; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010). Gul et al. (2007) show
that female representation in a board of directors restricts earnings management
more than male representation in a board of directors. Peni and Vähämaa (2010)
documented that female chief financial officers choose more income-decreasing
accounting policies than their male counterparts. However, they did not find a
connection between a top executive officer’s gender and earnings management.
Collectively, the evidence on gender and earnings management suggests that
females in certain positions, particularly in highly regulated accounting
professions  (board  members  and  accountants)  in  public  firms,  are  more
conservative in their accounting policy choices than males.
In the context of auditors in US public corporations, Ittonen, Miettinen, and
Vähämaa (2010) show that male auditors charge higher audit fees than female
auditors. Their findings also suggest that male auditors are more dependent on
their clients than female auditors. Gold, Hunton, and Gomaa (2009) show that
females are more willing to provide judgments such as going-concern opinions
in  their  audit  reports.  Recently,  Hardies,  Breesch,  and  Branson  (2014)  found  a
similar behavioral pattern regarding female and male auditors in private firms.
Especially  in  small  firms,  which  most  often  lack  internal  accounting
expertise, auditors are strongly involved in accounting as independent
professionals. Some studies suggest that the presence of high-quality auditors
makes a  difference in  the accounting choices  of  private  firms (Van Tendeloo &
Vanstraelen, 2008; Cano-Rodríquez, 2010). These results imply that some
auditors  use  accounting  judgment  for  the  purpose  of  providing  more  or  less
credible information to outside investors. Less is known about auditors’ gender
and earnings management in private firms.
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2 Summary and
contributions of the essays
2.1 ESSAY 1
The first essay investigates whether the earnings of private firms are managed
more  for  tax  reasons  in  high  than  in  low  tax  alignment  countries  based  on
conditional conservatism. The sample was obtained from AMADEUS,
maintained by Bureau van Dijk, which contains financial information regarding
public and private European firms. The sample contains medium-sized and
large private firms from 13 member states of the European Union for the period
2005–2011. In the sample, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are
classified as low tax alignment countries, and the rest of the sample countries
(namely  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal,
Spain, and Sweden) are classified as high tax alignment countries. Following
prior  studies  (see  Burgstahler  et  al.,  2006;  Peek  et  al.,  2010),  this  dichotomy  is
used to classify European countries into high and low tax alignment regimes.
Two piece-wise linear regression models of conditional conservatism were
estimated: Basu’s (1997) time-series persistence of transitory loss components of
earnings and Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model of differential accruals
processes of gains and losses based on cash flow from operations. Both models
are based on the assumption that a more timely recognition of economic losses
than  gains  imposes  more  variation  in  reported  earnings,  and  hence,  restricts
aggressive income smoothing. Conditional conservatism may be more valuable
for owners in high tax alignment countries from an earnings management
perspective because this accounting policy allows more flexibility in shifting
income across periods allowing large negative shocks in current earnings for
tax-related reasons. This is because owners presumably demand less credible
signals regarding the timely accounting recognition of economic losses in the
context of private firms.
We  find  that  more  tax-induced  reporting  conservatism  occurs  in  high  tax
alignment countries than in low tax alignment countries after controlling for tax
incentive and firm-specific determinants for conditional conservatism.
Specifically, we show that the result only holds for firm-years with positive cash
flow from operations/pretax accounting earnings. When it comes to negative
cash flow, we observe no differences between high and low tax alignment
countries in the conditional conservatism of private firms. Thus, the study
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provides a taxation-based explanation for conditional conservatism, which is
attributable to the differential degrees in tax alignment between countries in
private firms.
Contribution of Essay 1
The prior literature provides several alternative explanations for conditional
conservatism such as contracts, litigation, taxation, and regulation (Watts, 2003a).
While tax incentives’ effects on earnings management have been widely studied
among  public  corporations  in  the  US,  we  still  do  not  know  much  about  the
impacts of tax incentives on conditional conservatism. The prior literature
provides mixed views on whether unconditional, conditional, or both are
induced by taxation (Qiang, 2007; García Lara et al., 2009). In addition, prior
studies  of  conditional  conservatism  in  specific  institutions  have  focused  on
investor protection in public and private firms (see Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al.,
2003; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Peek et al., 2010). However, empirical literature
on conditional conservatism and tax alignment is scarce. Focusing on
conditional  conservatism,  the first  essay extends prior  studies  on strong versus
weak tax alignment and earnings management limited to distinguish between
timeliness  of  economic  gains  and  losses  reported  for  taxation  purposes
(Coppens & Peek, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Goncharov & Zimmermann,
2006; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Taken from the perspective of owners
through taxation for private-firm reporting, the results of the first essay also
contribute to the literature on reporting demands by investors in private firms
(Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Peek et al., 2010).
2.2 ESSAY 2
The second essay takes advantage of the Finnish tax reform of 2005 as a natural
experiment for the purpose of addressing the question of whether earnings are
managed to avoid corporate or owners’ tax when incentives compete in private
firms. The Finnish tax reform of 2005 provides an excellent setting for this type
of investigation because the tax laws were changed so that corporate tax rates
were decreased and tax rates for dividends were increased simultaneously. Due
to Finland’s high tax alignment accounting, managers of private firms with
strong owner opportunism have less discretion in terms of minimizing both
corporate and personal tax through dividend payments simultaneously because
they manage earnings in response to the tax reform. The essay uses two
measures for earnings management: the modified Jones (1991) model based on
discretionary accruals and the DeFond and Park (2001) model based on
unexpected working capital accruals. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995)
suggest that the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model is the best indicator
of  the  upward  type  of  earnings  management.  The  panel  data  for  both  models
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were obtained from AMADEUS. The experiment year for both models was 2004,
which was the year prior to the effective date of the tax reform.
The results suggest that owners’ tax minimization through dividends
dominated  over  corporate  income  tax  minimization  in  terms  of  earnings
management. Specifically, private firms did not manage earnings downwards in
2004  to  shift  income  to  a  later  period,  but  they  opportunistically  managed
earnings upwards in 2004 in order to receive the tax benefits from the more
favorable dividend taxation system (the lower dividend tax rate). This study
further showed that the results became stronger with decreasing private firm
size as a proxy for the strength of managerial self-interest through implicit
ownership concentration. Thus, the study sheds light on how owner
opportunism  manifested  in  the  form  of  tax  avoidance,  which  dominated  the
resource allocations of small private firms.
Contribution of Essay 2
The second essay contributes to the prior literature on tax-induced earnings
management regarding corporate taxation (Scholes et al., 1992; Guenther, 1994;
Watrin,  Pott,  &  Ullmann,  2012).  The  second  essay  also  contributes  to  the  prior
literature on the Finnish tax reform of 2005 regarding the dividend policy
decisions of private firms (Kari et al., 2008; Kari et al., 2009; Harju & Matikka,
2013). By taking advantage of the research setting of private firms, the second
essay provides evidence for strong owner opportunism involved in earnings
management. In addition, utilizing the Finnish tax reform of 2005 as a natural
experiment, the second essay is able to conduct a powerful test and draw strong
conclusions about causal inferences between incentives to minimize corporate or
owners’ tax and earnings management. The Finnish tax reform provides an
excellent setting for this type of investigation because the tax laws were changed
so that corporate tax rates were decreased and tax rates for dividends were
increased simultaneously.
2.3 ESSAY 3
The third essay investigates whether there are differences in earnings
management between male- and female-audited private firms. The Jones (1991)
model is used to estimate discretionary accruals for Finnish, small and medium-
sized, private firms. The final test sample, obtained from VOITTO, maintained
by Suomen Asiakastieto Oy, consisted of 3,900 individual firms and 13,908
observations for the period 1999–2006.
Our results concerning the differences in earnings management practices
between firms audited by males and females are twofold. First, when we regress
the absolute (unsigned) earnings management on a gender dummy and a set of
control  variables,  we  find  that  female  auditors  were  associated  with  more
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earnings management. When the analysis is conducted separately for sub-
samples of income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals, we
find that females were associated with more income-decreasing discretionary
accruals  than  males.  These  results  imply  that  female  auditors  are  more
restrictive regarding their subjective accounting judgments concerning positive
(income-increasing) discretionary accruals than male auditors.
2.4 ESSAY 4
The fourth essay also takes advantage of the research setting of Finnish private
firms for the purpose of investigating whether there are differences in cosmetic
earnings management between male- and female-audited private firms. In total,
our final sample obtained from VOITTO consists of 12,357 observations with a
positive net income for the period 1999–2006. Our findings suggest that cosmetic
earnings management, that is, the small upward rounding of the first digit of the
net income number based on Carslaw’s (1988) theory, is more evident among
male  auditors  than  female  auditors  in  private  firms.  Thus,  the  results  of  the
fourth essay suggest that cosmetic earnings management is a common
phenomenon that is attributable to the auditor’s gender in private firms.
Contributions of essays 3 and 4
Focusing on the research context of auditors, the third and fourth essays extend
the literature on gender and earnings management regarding the managers and
directors of public firms (Gul et al., 2007; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Peni &
Vähämaa, 2010). These essays also contribute to the prior earnings management
literature regarding big auditors in private firms (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen,
2008; Cano-Rodríques, 2010). The Finnish private firm setting is useful from the
perspective of the third and fourth essays because auditors were obligated to
individually sign the audit reports, even in the smallest companies, during the
research period. This is in contrast to the dominant institutional settings, such as
those  in  the  US,  in  which  the  audit  reports  of  large  public  companies  are
typically signed by the audit firm. In addition, the Finnish private firm setting is
unique because the financial statements are typically audited by a single
independent  auditor,  and  more  than  one  chosen  auditor  was  a  volunteer  in  a
small firm during the research period. This is in contrast to large public
corporations,  which  are  typically  audited  by  teams  of  auditors.  Hence,  the
Finnish private firm setting makes it possible to identify the auditor’s gender
and  other  auditor  characteristics.  Thus,  it  provides  a  new  context  in  which  to
investigate the relationship between gender and earnings management.
The third essay adopts the earnings management perspective based on
signed discretionary accruals. The fourth essay adopts a signaling perspective
regarding the earnings management of client firms based on earnings cosmetics.
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Thus, the fourth essay also contributes to the prior literature on earnings
cosmetics regarding public corporations.
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3 Conclusions and
contributions of the
dissertation
The first essay investigates whether the earnings of private firms are managed
more  for  tax  reasons  in  high  than  in  low  tax  alignment  countries  based  on
conditional  conservatism.  The  results  of  the  first  essay  support  prior  studies,
which suggest that conditional conservatism is induced by taxation in listed US
firms (García Lara et al., 2009), by showing that conditional conservatism is
induced by taxation in private firms and that this is especially true in high tax
alignment environments (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Since tax-induced reporting
can be directed to  the owners’  reporting demands,  the  results  of  the  first  essay
imply that it is not only creditors and shareholders who have differential
reporting  demands  in  private  firms  as  suggested  by  prior  studies  (Peek  et  al.,
2010). In addition, the reporting demands regarding timely recognition of
economic gains and losses between shareholders differ depending on the degree
of country-specific tax alignment. Institutional factors, including omitted ones,
overlap in practice (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998); therefore,
the results of the first essay must be interpreted with caution. However,
evidence regarding negative and positive cash flows/pretax earnings, which
differentiate tax incentives from other earnings management incentives in
private firms, adds robustness to the first essay’s results.
Focusing  on  the  Finnish  tax  reform  of  2005  as  a  natural  experiment,  the
second essay examines whether earnings are managed more to minimize
corporate tax or owners’ tax when incentives compete in private firms. The
results of the second essay suggest that owners’ tax minimization dominated
over firm tax minimization and affected earnings management. Given that
under a dual taxation system, owners personally bear the accumulated costs
from firm income and dividend tax, the results of the second essay suggest that
tax-induced earnings management in private firms is determined by owners’
personal  tax  avoidance.  Such  behavior  affected  resource  allocation  in  the
economy through excessive dividends. Collectively, the results of the first and
second essays imply that subjecting net earnings to managerial judgment seems
to be the trade-off between the owners’ (and managers’) contractual benefits
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related to dividends and taxation, as well as income smoothing in case of losses,
in private firms.
The  third  and  fourth  essays  investigate  whether  there  are  differences  in
(cosmetic) earnings management between male- and female-audited private
firms. Collectively, the results of the third and fourth essays suggest that female-
audited firms overstate reported earnings less than male-audited firms, and that
this is also true on a cosmetic level. The results of the third essay support prior
studies – which suggest that firms’ female accounting professionals are more
conservative in accounting than their male counterparts – by showing that this is
also true at the auditor level. As suggested in prior studies, female auditors are
more  likely  to  intervene  in  accounting  misstatements  or  errors  based  on
evidence on audit reports than male auditors. The results of the fourth essay
suggest that male auditors are less likely to intervene in accounting
misstatements or errors than female auditors since earnings cosmetics is more
likely to occur in male-audited than in female-audited private firms. Prior
studies also suggest that male auditors may be more dependent on their clients
than female auditors. Thus, differences in professional ethics (audit quality)
between female and male auditors cannot be ruled out as an alternative
explanation for the observed differences in earnings management between male-
and female-audited private firms in the third and fourth essays. Thus, the results
of the fourth essay suggest that gender-based differences in auditing affect the
earnings quality of private firms.
Collectively, the results of the dissertation enhance our understanding of
earnings management in private firms. The first,  third, and fourth essays take a
wider view of earnings management when examining factors that limit earnings
management  in  private  firms,  such  as  high  versus  low  tax  alignments  and  the
auditor’s  gender.  The  second  essay  examines  whether  tax  incentives  at  the
owner  level  arising  from  dividend  tax  rate  changes,  in  isolation  from  other
reporting incentives, affect resource allocation in the economy through earnings
management. In addition, the first and fourth essays enhance our understanding
of income smoothing and signaling in private firms.
The Finnish private firm setting used in the second, third, and fourth essays
provides a methodological advantage when investigating earnings management
from various perspectives. This is because local Finnish accounting rules, much
like local accounting rules in many other European code-law countries, provide
more  opportunities  to  manage  earnings,  i.e.,  income  smoothing.  This  is  in
contrast to dominant institutional settings, such as those in the US, which
operate under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles that are primarily
designed to ensure the usefulness of accounting information for investors.
The results of this doctoral dissertation may have practical relevance for the
stakeholders of private firms and legislators. Contractual-based earnings
management on behalf of owners may become costly to governments because
tax-induced earnings management lowers the tax receipts, and thus, runs
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counter to the needs of taxing authorities and other stakeholders. If dividends
have become excessively paid by private firms, as suggested in the second essay,
this  may  not  be  in  accordance  with  the  best  interests  of  lenders,  which  are
typically important investors in private firms. Although the observed
differences in the earnings management of male- and female-audited firms in
the  third  and  fourth  essays  are  indeed  marginal,  the  signaling  may  have  a
considerable effect on the decisions of interest groups.
The dual taxation of owners’ income is now partially applied in Finland,
where corporate and dividend tax rates have been subject to continual change in
recent years. From a regulative perspective, the results of the second essay imply
that tightening the owners’ taxation through dividends may have a larger
impact on the economy as a whole if the ownership of private limited liability
companies becomes less attractive in Finland. In addition, if tax-free dividends
under  a  dual  taxation  system,  which  provides  ‘dividend  tax  carrots,’  becomes
more subject to earnings management, this may not serve the financial statement
users’ interests in terms of reducing the information asymmetries and agency
costs in Finnish private firms either.
Recently, there have been calls for greater conformity between financial and
tax  accounting  in  the  US  (a  move  toward  the  European  system)  because  this
reduces the compliance costs and adds monitoring opportunities (Freedman,
2008). The results of the first essay suggest that tax alignment, as an institutional
factor, shapes the reporting demands of shareholders regarding timely
recognition  of  economic  gains  and  losses  reported  for  tax  reasons  in  private
firms. In particular, high tax alignment limits income smoothing (especially
boosting earnings up) more dramatically than low tax alignment. This may
increase information asymmetries, especially in public firms, and it certainly
works against the reporting needs of those firms that once smoothed their
earnings.  However,  the  results  of  the  first  essay  may  not  hold  for  public  firms
since their reporting environment and governance structure differ from those
privately held.
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to investigate whether tax-induced conditional
conservatism differs  in  high versus low tax alignment  countries  in  a  sample of
medium- and large-sized private firms in 13 European countries. The results
suggest  that  conservatism  in  tax-induced  reporting  is  more  likely  to  occur  in
high tax alignment countries after controlling for tax incentive and firm-specific
determinants of conditional conservatism. Specifically, we show that the result
only  holds  for  firm  years  with  positive  cash  flow  from  operations/pretax
accounting earnings. When it comes to negative cash flow, we observe no
differences between high and low tax alignment countries in the conditional
conservatism of private firms. Thus, the study sheds light on how tax alignment,
as  an  institutional  factor,  shapes  the  reporting  demands  regarding  timely
recognition of economic gains and losses reported for tax reasons by private-
firm shareholders.
JEL classifications: K22, K34, M41, M48
Keywords: conditional conservatism; tax alignment; reporting incentives;
private firms
1 Introduction
Conditional conservatism, as one dimension of overall accounting conservatism,
generates earnings that reflect ‘bad news’ in a timelier manner than ‘good news’
due to the existence of greater verification requirements for the recognition of
economic gains than the recognition of economic losses (Basu, 1997).
Unconditional conservatism is ‘news independent’ and generates a persistent
‘unrecorded goodwill’ (Beaver & Ryan, 2005). Carcía Lara, Carcía Osma, and
Penalva (2009) suggest that conditional conservatism is a valuable accounting
strategy to minimize the tax bill for firms since it provides more flexibility in
income shifts across periods either through timelier recognition of losses or
delays of current economic gains than unconditional conservatism.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether tax-induced conditional
conservatism differs  in  high versus low tax alignment  countries  in  a  sample of
medium- and large-sized private firms from 13 European countries. Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden
represent  the  countries  with  a  high  tax  alignment,  in  which  taxable  income  is
almost identical to accounting net income. The rest of the countries, i.e., the UK,
Ireland,  and  the  Netherlands,  represent  low  tax  alignment  countries.  Many  of
those  countries,  such  as  the  UK,  use  two  parallel  (common  law)  systems  for
calculating taxable income under public sector rules and accounting income for
financial reporting. Consequently, the tax-saving issues for financial reporting
become  more  important  for  firms  operating  in  high  tax  alignment  countries
compared to those in low tax alignment countries.
The prior literature provides contracting, litigation, regulation, and taxation
explanations for accounting conservatism (Watts, 2003a); and empirically
provides mixed views on the role of taxation inducing conservatism regarding
its two dimensions (Basu, 2005; Qiang, 2007; Carcía Lara et al., 2009). This
literature  is  limited  to  US  public  corporations  (which  represent  a  low  tax
alignment country), and we argue that these results cannot be applied to high
tax alignment environments. Since capital market forces are weaker with respect
to private firms, and since tax issues are relatively more important in private
firms (Beatty & Harris, 1999; Mills & Newberry, 2001; Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 2002;
Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Peek, Cuijpers, & Buijink, 2010), it is possible that
these results do not hold for private firms.
Another  body  of  research  focuses  on  high  versus  low  tax  alignment  and
financial reporting (Coppens & Peek, 2005; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006;
Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). These
studies document that the earnings of private firms are more managed (at the
2aggregate level) in high tax alignment countries than in low tax alignment
countries. These studies provide a taxation-based explanation for the
observations. However, they are mostly limited to summary measures of
earnings management, which may signal a number of reporting incentives (also
other  than  tax).  Furthermore,  these  studies  are  limited  in  their  assessment  of
whether the earnings management of private firms regarding timeliness of
economic gains and losses induced by taxation differs between the two country
categories. We contribute to this literature by using conditional conservatism. As
suggested by García Lara et al. (2009), conditional conservatism allows firms to
report  earnings  in  a  less  smooth  manner  by  providing  flexibility  using
temporary, significant, current earnings decreases and income shifts from
periods for tax reporting purposes. In addition, by focusing on high versus low
tax  alignment  as  an  important  institutional  factor,  our  study  contributes  to  the
discussion about institutional factors that determine the conditional
conservatism of public and private firms worldwide (see Ball, Kothari, & Robin,
2000; Leuz, Dhananjay, & Wysocki, 2003; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006; Peek et al.,
2010).
Our findings show that tax-induced reporting conservatism is more likely to
occur in high tax alignment countries than in low tax alignment countries after
controlling for tax incentive and firm-specific determinants of conditional
conservatism.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  offers  the
theoretical background and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
research design and data. Section 4 presents the main results and the sensitivity
analyses. Section 5 features a discussion and concludes the paper.
32 Theoretical background
and hypotheses development
The literature provides several explanations for reporting conservatism,
including contracting, shareholder litigation, accounting regulation, and
taxation explanations (Watts, 2003a, 2003b). Prior studies, which were mostly
conducted  in  common  law  countries  such  as  the  US  and  the  UK,  suggest  that
conservatism enhances the contracting efficiency of the various stakeholders of a
firm (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, & Stanford-Harris, 2002; Beekes, Pope, & Young,
2004; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Qiang, 2007; Lafond & Roychowdhury, 2008).
Support for this argument is also provided by cross-country studies, such as Ball,
Kothari, and Robin (2000) as well as Leuz, Dhananjay, and Wysocki (2003),
which suggest that conditional conservatism is induced by investor protection in
public firms. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) identified several institutional
factors that determine the conditional conservatism of public-firm accounting.
Qiang (2007) draws a distinction between conditional and unconditional
conservatism, and shows that “news independent” unconditional conservatism,
which can be considered as less valuable for stakeholders, is induced by taxation,
whereas conditional conservatism is induced by contracts and litigation
according to data from US public firms. Recently, Carcía Lara et al. (2009) have
extended Qiang’s (2007) research and provided contradictory results regarding
conditional conservatism and taxation using data from US public firms.
The effects of taxes on earnings management has been studied extensively in
the context of US public firms (see Scholes, Wilson, & Wolfson, 1992; Guenther,
1994; Guenther, Maydew, & Nutter, 1997; Maydew, 1997; Lopez, Regier, & Lee,
1998; Beatty & Harris, 1999; Keating & Zimmerman, 1999; Phillips, Pincus, &
Rego, 2003; Krull, 2004; Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus, & Rego, 2009). A growing
body of research attempts to assess the relationship between firm-level book-tax
differences and earnings quality based on the extent of earnings management,
earnings  persistence,  and  stock  market  reactions  in  US  public  firms  (Hanlon,
2005; Frank et al., 2009; Blaylock, Shevlin, & Wilson, 2012) and in other countries
(Tang & Firth, 2011, 2012; Blaylock, Gaertner, & Shevlin, 2012). This empirical
literature shows that large book-tax differences signal low-quality earnings.
However, in their cross-country study, Blaylock et al. (2012) presented
contradictory results based on earnings management.
4The effects of taxes on earnings management has also been studied in public
and private firms worldwide (Beatty & Harris, 1999; Mills & Newberry, 2001;
Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 2002; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Goncharov & Zimmermann,
2006; Noronha, Zeng, & Vinten, 2008). These studies document that private
firms engage more in earnings management (i.e., for tax reporting purposes)
than public firms. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) demonstrated that conditional
conservatism  is  lower  in  private  firms  than  in  public  firms  in  the  UK.  They
interpreted this difference in earnings quality between private and public firms
as being due to a difference in market demand; private firms are able to
communicate with stakeholders through channels other than general public
financial statements. Peek et al. (2010) documented that while country-specific
creditor protection makes a difference in conditional conservatism between
private and public firms, a country’s degree of investor protection does not.
Their interpretation of the findings is that private-firm creditors in countries
with  strong  creditor  protections  demand  greater  conditional  conservatism  but
that well-protected investors do not.
The previous literature suggests that tax-induced earnings management of
private firms is especially apparent in high tax alignment countries (Coppens &
Peek, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006; Moreira,
2006; Garrod, Ratej, & Valentincic, 2007; Marques, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011;
Watrin, Pott, & Ullmann, 2012). In their recent study, Peek et al. (2010)
controlled  for  tax  alignment  on  conditional  conservatism  but  did  not  find  a
significant relationship. However, they did not control for cash/accounting
losses as a proxy for tax incentive as we do.
Private firms in low tax alignment countries may choose to follow two
distinct reporting strategies: one for investors and another for tax authorities.
However,  for  private  firms  in  high  tax  alignment  countries,  only  one  of  these
strategies  is  more  or  less  available  at  one  time.  From  a  taxation  point  of  view,
conditional conservatism is useful since it allows firms to temporarily reduce
their  current  income;  therefore,  it  provides  flexibility  to  shift  income  from
periods for tax reasons. García Lara et al. (2009) suggest that conditional
conservatism is a more effective accounting policy than unconditional
conservatism regarding accounting responses to the differences in marginal tax
rates, which may affect the tax-induced reporting of firms. Therefore, for private
firms in high tax alignment countries, we predict the following:
H1: The economic losses of private firms are recognized as more transitory and in a
timelier manner than economic gains (conditional conservatism) in high tax alignment
countries when the tax incentive for financial reporting is high.
It can be supposed that private firms in high tax alignment countries face more
temporary income-decreasing tax incentives for financial reporting than private
firms  in  low  tax  alignment  countries.  In  particular,  since  the  tax  savings
5arguments for private firms’ financial reporting become stronger when the
book-tax alignment is high, we predict the following:
H2: Greater conditional conservatism (asymmetry in economic gain and loss recognition)
is observed for private firms in high tax alignment countries than in low tax alignment
countries when the tax incentive for financial reporting is high.
63 Research design
3.1  EMPIRICAL MODELS
As a measure for conditional conservatism, we use a modified version of Basu’s
(1997) serial dependence model for the reversal of the pretax earnings changes
of private firms. More specifically, we estimate the following equation to allow
for differences in the reversal of positive and negative pretax earnings changes
between private firms in countries with high and low tax alignments (1):
∆NIjt = β0 + β1 D∆NIjt − 1 + β2∆NIjt − 1 + β3 D∆NIjt − 1× ∆NIjt − 1
+ β4 TAXALIGNjt + β5 TAXALIGNjt × D∆NIjt – 1
+ β6 TAXALIGNjt × ∆NIjt − 1
+ β7 TAXALIGNjt × D∆NIjt − 1 × ∆NIjt − 1
+ CONTROLSjt + εjt (1)
where TAXALIGNjt equals 1 for private firm j if it has its domicile in Ireland, the
UK, or the Netherlands (low tax alignment countries) at t, and 0 otherwise; ∆NIjt
equals the change in pretax earnings from t − 1 to t, standardized by total assets
at the end of t − 1 for private firm j; ∆NIjt − 1 equals the change in pretax earnings
from t − 2 to t − 1, standardized by total assets at the end of t − 1 for private firm j;
and D∆NIjt − 1 equals 1 if ∆NIjt − 1 is negative, and 0 otherwise. We use the changes
in pretax earnings instead of changes in net earnings as in Basu’s (1997) original
model to better assess the tax-motivated conditional conservatism of private
firms.  In  addition,  we  control  for  high  and  low  tax  incentives  for  financial
reporting  by  estimating  equation  (1)  for  a  sub-sample  of  observations  with
positive and negative cash flow from operations.
Our prediction concerning private firms in high tax alignment countries is
that negative earnings changes are more likely to reverse than positive earnings
changes, indicating that the expected signs for β2 and  β3 are negative. We also
predict that conditional conservatism (asymmetry of economic gain and loss
recognition) is greater for private firms in high tax alignment countries than in
low tax alignment countries, indicating that the expected sign for β7 is positive,
when the tax incentive for financial reporting is high.
Our CONTROLSjt includes Sizejt, Leveragejt, Growthjt, and Cyclejt with
interactions. Sizejt equals the natural log of year-end total assets at t for private
firm j. Leveragejt equals total non-current liabilities divided by total assets at the
7end of t for private firm j. Growthjt equals the percentage of change in turnover
from t – 1 to t for private firm j. Cyclejt equals operating cycle length (expressed
in years), which is computed as average receivables from t –  1  to t scaled by
turnover at t plus average inventories from t –  1  to t scaled by operating
expenses at t for private firm j. Sales were unavailable for some observations.
Therefore, we replace sales with turnover to compute Growthjt and Cyclejt. Prior
studies controlled these firm-specific characteristics of earnings timeliness (see
Peek et al., 2010). As in Peek et al.’s (2010) study, these control variables are firm
averages centered on the sample mean to address multicollinearity.
Some studies suggest that the presence of high-quality auditors makes a
difference in private firms’ conditional conservatism and earnings management,
and this is especially true in high tax alignment environments (Van Tendeloo &
Vanstraelen, 2008; Cano-Rodríquez, 2010). In line with these results, it is
reasonable to control for audit quality measured by audit firm size in our
analysis of differential tax-induced conditional conservatism of private firms
between high and low tax alignment European countries. However, AMADAUS
only provides the data for audit firm size from last fiscal year, and therefore, it is
limited for the purpose of controlling for audit quality in time-series analysis.
Nonetheless, we believe that our analysis regarding negative and positive cash
flows as well as pretax earnings differentiating tax incentives from other
earnings management incentives in private firms adds robustness to the analysis
regardless of controlling for audit firm size.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggested that Basu’s (1997) serial dependence
model cannot distinguish between transitory gain and loss components in
earnings caused by random accrual errors, and that it does not take into account
the timeliness of transitory components in earnings through the accrual process.
To  address  these  limitations,  we  use  an  alternative  model  to  better  assess
earnings timeliness through the accrual process of private firms. Specifically, we
estimate the following modification of Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model to
allow differences in accrual-based conditional conservatism between private
firms in countries with high and low tax alignments (2):
ACCjt = δ0 + δ1 D∆CFOjt + δ2∆CFOjt + δ3 D∆CFOjt × ∆CFOjt
+ δ4 TAXALIGNjt + δ5 TAXALIGNjt × D∆CFOjt
+ δ6 TAXALIGNjt × ∆CFOjt
+ δ7 TAXALIGNjt × D∆CFOjt × ∆CFOjt
+ CONTROLSjt + εjt (2)
where ACCjt equals accruals for private firm j at t, which are computed as the
change in non-cash working capital (∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other current
assets − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities) minus depreciation, standardized
8by  total  assets  at  the  end  of t − 1; ∆CFOjt equals  the  change  in  cash  flow  from
operations from t − 1 to t,  standardized  by  total  assets  at  the  end  of t − 1 for
private firm j,  where  cash  flow  from  operations  equals  net  income  before
extraordinary  items  minus  accruals  at t; and D∆CFOjt equals  1  if ∆CFOjt is
negative,  and  0  otherwise.  We  use  the  changes  instead  of  levels  in  cash  flow
from operations to eliminate potential survivor bias. As Ball and Shivakumar
(2005) noted, firms with negative cash flow changes are less likely to be non-
survivors  than  firms  with  negative  cash  flow  levels.  Therefore,  firms  with
negative cash flows may have lower incentives to manage earnings downwards
for  tax  reporting  purposes.  We  control  for  high  and  low  tax  incentives  for
financial reporting by estimating equation (2) for a sub-sample of observations
with positive and negative cash flow from operations.
Following the prior literature (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), we predict that
accruals and cash flow changes are negatively interrelated. We also predict that
unrealized losses are more likely to be reported than gains, and that they are less
likely to be offset by accruals. Our primary prediction is that we are more likely
to observe conditional conservatism of private firms in high tax alignment
countries than in low tax alignment countries. CONTROLSjt are  defined  above
with model (1).
3.2  DATA
Data were collected from the AMADEUS database (March 2013 version)
supplied by Bureau van Dijk. AMADEUS provides financial statement
information on public and private firms across Europe. We focus on the fiscal
years between 2003 and 2011. Our sample selection procedures mainly follow
the guidelines established by Peek et al. (2010) and Burgstahler et al. (2006).
We  concentrate  on  private  firms  domiciled  in  one  of  the  following  15  EU
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  and the
UK. During the sample period, many other European countries (such as
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) joined the EU. However,
accounting  rules  were  not  yet  stabilized  in  some  of  these  countries  during  the
sample period; therefore, these countries are excluded from the analysis. Due to
missing  data,  we  also  exclude  Denmark  and  Luxembourg.  Financial  and  tax
accounting are expected to be more aligned in Ireland, the Netherlands, and the
UK than in the other sample countries.
We focus on medium- or large-sized private firms to ensure that the sample
firms meet similar reporting requirements based on the Fourth EU Directive.
The Fourth EU Directive states  that  smaller  companies  are  allowed to  draw up
abridged income statements and balance sheets; Articles 11 and 27 also
9distinguish between the different-sized private firms in more detail. In addition,
small limited companies are not obligated to audit their financial statements.
Following Burgstahler et al. (2006), a medium- or large-sized private firm should
exceed two or more of the following lower bounds in every fiscal year: a balance
sheet  total  of  €2.5  million,  a  turnover  of  €5  million,  and  at  least  50  employees.
We further exclude banks and insurance firms (a Standard Industrial
Classification [SIC] in the range 6,000–6,799), public institutions (a SIC above
9,000), and privately held subsidiaries of quoted firms, because subsidiaries are
likely to be dependent on their parent firms’ financial decisions. Next, we screen
out  legal  forms  other  than  limited  firms,  because  legal  forms,  like
proprietorships and partnerships, do not pay taxes individually. In
proprietorships and partnerships, firm income taxation is bound to individual
taxation; therefore, taxation is not readily available on financial reports.
Moreover, these firms may not fully apply the same reporting principles that
limited firms do (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Consequently, we further exclude
observations with unknown taxation values.
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) noted that over 30% of yearly changes in the
book value of total assets (increases or decreases) can be caused by occasional
transactions like mergers, restructurings, or disinvestments. Therefore, we
exclude observations with a yearly change of over 30% in total assets.
Finally, after eliminating anomalies in financial statement items (such as
unexpected  signs  in  these  items),  and  after  excluding  1%  on  minimum  and
maximum values for ∆NIjt, ∆NIjt − 1, ACCjt,  and  ∆CFOjt,  our  final  sample
excluding CONTROLSjt consists of the following: 179,162 firm-year observations
(52,383 individual firms) for (1) and 151,821 firm-year observations (46,029
individual firms) for (2). Our final sample adding CONTROLSjt consists of the
following: 153,926 firm-year observations (46,902 individual firms) for (1) and
138,225 firm-year observations (43,171 individual firms) for (2).
[Insert Table A.1 from about here]
Table 1 presents the country-based frequencies and percentages of observations
for the total sample employed in models (1)–(2). Based on sample size by
country, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain dominate, whereas Greece, Belgium,
and Ireland have the smallest number of observations in models (1)–(2).
[Insert tables A.2 and A.3 about here]
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics and univariate mean
comparisons of accounting variables of private firms in high and low tax
alignment  countries  and the descriptive statistics  for  a  total  sample for  models
(1)–(2).
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Table 2 shows that pretax accounting earnings scaled by lagged total assets,
NIjt, are 0.063 (0.073) for the average private firm in high (low) tax alignment
countries. Table 3 shows that total accruals standardized by total assets, ACCjt,
are −0.036 (−0.029) for the average private firm in high (low) tax alignment
countries. These results suggest that private firms in high tax alignment
countries report greater losses and more conservative earnings based on overall
accruals  than private  firms in  low tax alignment  countries.  In  addition,  Table  3
shows that cash flow from operations standardized by total assets, CFOjt, are
0.075 (0.081) for the average private firm in high (low) tax alignment countries.
Based on a total sample of (1), the average private firm in a high (low) tax
alignment country has total assets (Sizejt) of €44,573.2 (€68,387.6); a leverage
(Leveragejt) of 0.291 (0.277); a growth (Growthjt) of 0.035 (0.022); and a cycle (Cyclejt)
of 0.302 (0.240), and the differences are statistically significant. Based on a total
sample of (2), the average private firm in a high (low) tax alignment country has
total assets (Sizejt) of €44,099.0 (€64,294.4); a leverage (Leveragejt) of 0.288 (0.277); a
growth  (Growthjt) of 0.035 (0.022); and a cycle (Cyclejt) of 0.308 (0.236), and the
differences are statistically significant. This is further evidence of the need to
control the size, leverage, growth, and cycle in the multivariate regression
analysis presented in the next section.
[Insert tables A.4 and A.5 about here]
Table 4 presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above)
the diagonal for variables employed in (1); and Table 5 presents the Pearson
(Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal for variables
employed in (2). Multicollinearity may produce biased regression coefficients if
the correlation coefficients between two or more independent variables in a
multiple regression model are greater than 0.8. We conclude that
multicollinearity is not a concern in the regression analysis presented in the next
section since none of the correlation coefficients between the independent
variables exceeded 0.8, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5.he sample was collected
from  the  AMADEUS  database,  which  is  maintained  by  Bureau  van  Dijk.  I
focused on the financial statements of Finnish private limited firms available for
the period from 2002 to 2009. Several additional filters were applied; for
example, only firms with available information on financial statements
including taxation were selected for further sample selection.1 This criterion
yielded 105,001 firm-year observations (13,482 individual firms). I further
excluded private firms that were operating in financial or insurance sectors
because  their  financial  statements  would  likely  differ  from  those  operating  in
1 In the sample period, most limited private Finnish firms were obligated to audit their financial
statements with the exception that only very small firms (total assets less than  €100 thousand) were
not obligated to audit their financial statements in the later sample years (since the change in audit
requirement criteria in June 2007). Therefore, I did not set any size criteria for Finnish private firms.
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other  sectors.  Finally,  after  eliminating  anomalies  in  financial  statement  items,
and  after  excluding  one  percent  of  extreme  values  for  all  continuous  variables
employed in (1), (2), (3), and (4), the final sample consisted of 70,128 firm-year
observations (13,164 individual firms) for (2); and 78,127 firm-year observations
(12,841 individual firms) for (4).
12
4 Results
[Insert Table A.6 about here]
Table 6 presents the results for model (1) estimated for a total sample and for a
sub-sample of observations with positive (i) and negative (iii) contemporaneous
cash  flow  from  operations.  Table  6  shows  that  negative  earnings  changes  are
more likely to reverse than positive earnings changes in high tax alignment
countries, which implies that conditionally conservative earnings are reported in
these private firms, as predicted (H1). The total sample analysis presented in
Table 7 shows that about 26.5% of negative pretax earnings changes are likely to
reverse in high tax alignment countries; and 26.4% of negative pretax earnings
changes are likely to reverse in low tax alignment countries; and the differences
are marginally significant (as with all regressions presented in Table 6 except the
regression presented in column (i), which is insignificant), as predicted (H2).
Contrary to predictions, it seems that the results presented in Table 7 are
insensitive with the sign of contemporaneous cash flow from operations
controlled.
[Insert Table A.7 about here]
Table 7 presents the results for model (2) estimated for a total sample and for a
sub-sample of observations with positive (i) and negative (iii) contemporaneous
cash flow from operations. Economic losses are recognized in a timelier manner
than gains for private firms in high tax alignment countries with negative
contemporaneous cash flow (i), as predicted (H1). Also as predicted (H2),
column (i) in Table 7 shows that conditional conservatism is greater for private
firms in high tax alignment countries than in low tax alignment countries. As
can be seen in column (i) in Table 7, when cash flows are positive about 15.6% of
negative cash flow changes are offset by accruals for high tax alignment
countries, whereas about 17.4% of negative cash flow changes are offset by
accruals for low tax alignment countries. These differences are statistically
significant, as predicted (H2). The results presented in Table 7 suggest that when
the tax incentive for financial reporting is high (cash flow is positive), more
conditional conservatism is observed in high tax alignment countries than in
low tax alignment countries.
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[Insert Table A.8 about here]
Table 8 presents the results for model (1) estimated for a total sample and for a
sub-sample of positive (i) and negative (iii) pretax earnings as an alternative
proxy  for  high  and  low  tax  incentives.  Column  (i)  and  column  (iii)  in  Table  8
show that negative earnings changes are more likely to reverse than positive
earnings changes in high tax alignment countries when pretax earnings are
positive (35.7%) than when they are negative (27.6%). Column (i) and column (iii)
in Table 8 also show that the differences in conditional conservatism between
private firms in high tax alignment countries and low tax alignment countries
are statistically significant only for a sub-sample of positive pretax earnings.
These  results  suggest  that  more  conditional  conservatism  occurs  in  high  tax
alignment countries than in low tax alignment countries when the tax incentive
for financial reporting in case of positive pretax earnings is high, as predicted
(H2).
AMADEUS provides consolidated financial statements when available and
parent firm financial statement information otherwise. Consolidated financial
statements are not liable to tax as individual entities. Therefore, it is reasonable
to test whether the results reported in tables 6 to 8 are sensitive to the exclusion
of consolidated financial statements. Columns (ii) and (iv) in tables 6 and 8
present the results for model (1); and columns (ii) and (iv) in Table 7 present the
results for model (2) estimated for a sub-sample of positive (ii) and negative (iv)
contemporaneous cash flow from operations excluding consolidated financial
statements. This additional sensitivity analysis revealed that the regression
results presented in tables 6 to 8 are insensitive to the exclusion of consolidated
financial statements.
The regression analysis of the panel data set is often subject to the potentially
biasing effects of heteroscedasticity and the autocorrelation of residuals since
accounting  variables  within  a  single  firm  are  correlated  in  a  time  series.  To
address this concern, the results presented in tables 4 to 7 were initially based
upon a covariance matrix estimator that is robust for heteroscedasticity (White,
1980), and within firm correlation of residuals.
Overall, the results presented in tables 6 to 8 suggest that greater tax-induced
reporting conservatism is observed for private firms in high tax alignment
countries than in low tax alignment countries after controlling for tax incentive
and firm-specific determinants of conditional conservatism. These results imply
that private firms in high tax alignment countries use more conditionally
conservative earnings for tax-related reasons than private firms in low tax
alignment countries, thereby supporting the hypotheses (H1 and H2).
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5 Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this study is to investigate whether tax-induced conditional
conservatism differs  in  high versus low tax alignment  countries  in  a  sample of
private  firms  in  13  member  states  of  the  EU.  This  study  contributes  to  prior
literature on the tax alignment and financial reporting of private firms. It also
extends the prior literature that was limited to US public firms, which provided
mixed views on whether conditional conservatism is induced by taxation. We
find that the conditional conservatism of private firms is induced by taxation
more in high tax alignment countries than in low tax alignment countries after
controlling for tax incentive and firm-specific determinants of conditional
conservatism.
We  interpret  the  findings  to  mean  that  private  firms  in  high  tax  alignment
environments engage more in earnings management based on conditional
accounting conservatism than those in low tax alignment countries, since this
accounting policy allows firms to temporarily decrease current earnings and
shift income from periods for tax-related reasons (as suggested by García Lara et
al.,  2009).  Firms  in  low  tax  alignment  countries  are  more  able  to  report  their
accounting  earnings  irrespective  of  taxable  income,  thus  making  tax  issues  in
financial reporting less important for them. This allows private firms in low tax
alignment countries to report smoother earnings as compared to private firms in
high tax alignment countries. Given that high tax alignment introduces more
downwards bias in financial reports in the form of conditional conservatism, it
also lowers  tax receipts,  and thus,  runs counter  to  the needs of  tax authorities.
However,  these  costs  are  offset  by  the  benefits  of  conditional  conservatism  for
different constituencies in private-firm financial reports, regulators, and the
economy in general. Focusing on institutions, prior studies documented that
differences in reporting demands between creditors and shareholders regarding
conditional conservatism exist in private firms (Peek et al., 2010). This study
sheds light on how tax alignment, as an institutional factor, shapes the reporting
demands regarding the tax-induced conditional conservatism of private-firm
shareholders.
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Appendices
Table A.1
The country-based frequencies and percentages of observations for a total sample
employed in (1) and (2)
(1) (2)
Country TAXALIGNjt N=153,926 N=138,225
Austria 0 2, 624 1, 70% 2, 238 1, 62%
Belgium 0 965 0, 63% 911 0, 66%
Finland 0 5, 434 3, 53% 5, 104 3, 69%
France 0 3, 950 2, 57% 3, 720 2, 69%
Germany 0 31, 015 20, 15% 25, 760 18, 64%
Greece 0 132 0, 09% 128 0, 09%
Ireland 1 1, 044 0, 68% 878 0, 64%
Italy 0 26, 521 17, 23% 26, 081 18, 87%
Netherlands 1 4, 878 3, 17% 2, 189 1, 58%
Portugal 0 3, 429 2, 23% 3, 307 2, 39%
Spain 0 16, 372 10, 64% 15, 719 11, 37%
Sweden 0 14, 289 9, 28% 13, 511 9, 77%
United Kingdom 1 43, 273 28, 11% 38, 679 27, 98%
Variable definitions: TAXALIGNjt, equals an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 for private firm j that has its domicile in Ireland, the United Kingdom, or
the Netherlands (low tax alignment countries) at t, and 0 otherwise.
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ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether corporate or owners’ tax minimization affected
earnings management when these incentives competed in private firms. The
Finnish  tax  reform  of  2005  provides  an  excellent  setting  for  this  type  of
investigation because the tax laws were changed so that corporate tax rates were
decreased and tax rates for dividends were increased simultaneously. The
findings indicate that owners’ personal tax minimization dominates over
corporate tax minimization and that this has had an effect on earnings
management. Specifically, managers of private firms did not manage earnings
downwards  in  the  year  prior  to  the  corporate  tax  rate  decrease,  but  they
opportunistically managed earnings upwards in order to receive tax benefits
from the more favorable dividend taxation system. Thus, this study sheds light
on how owner-opportunism in a form of tax minimization dominates the
resource allocations of small private firms via earnings management.
JEL classifications: G14, G18, K34, M41, M48
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11 Introduction
The term “earnings management” is generally defined as the choice by a manner
of  accounting  policies,  or  actions  affecting  earnings,  so  as  to  achieve  some
specific reported earnings objective (Scott 2009, 403). Earnings management can
take several patterns, such as of “taking a bath,” income minimization, income
maximization, or income smoothing (Scott 2009, 405). Tax related incentives for
income  minimization  or  income  shifting  may  occur  when  future  tax  rate
decreases (Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson 1992; Guenther 1994; Lopez, Regier and
Lee 1998). In contrast, income maximization may occur when a future corporate
tax rate suddenly increases (Monem 2003; Firth, Lo and Wong 2013). In addition,
the  effect  of  taxes  on  the  firm’s  capital  structure,  dividend,  and  investment
decisions has been widely studied with data from public firms (Desai and
Dharmapala 2009; Korkeamäki, Liljeblom and Pasternack 2010). However, little
is known about these issues in private firms that have a more concentrated
ownership structure and, consequently, strong owner-manager related
incentives.
This study examines whether tax minimization at the corporate or the owner
level affects earnings management when these incentives compete in private
firms. In this sense, the Finnish private firm setting is particularly interesting.
First, private firms are closely held with a substantial influence of owner-
managers  in  decisions  of  how  to  report  earnings,  in  e.g.,  for  compensation
purposes.  Prior  empirical  literature  suggest  that  earnings  are  more  likely  to  be
managed in private firms than in public firms with more separated ownership
and management structures (Beatty and Harris 1999; Mills and Newberry 2001;
Beatty, Ke and Petroni 2002; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Coppens and Peek 2005;
Goncharov and Zimmermann 2006; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006). Hence,
the private firm setting makes it possible to link the incentives of managers and
owners  when  the  effects  of  these  incentives  on  earnings  management  are
examined.
Second, in Finland, there is a strong conformity between the accounting and
the taxation of limited companies. This special characteristic of the Finnish
setting offers less discretion in reporting taxable earnings independently of
accounting  earnings.  This  is  in  contrast  to  low  tax  alignment  settings,  such  as
those  in  the  UK  and  the  US,  where  firms  have  more  discretion  to  overstate
earnings  for  reporting  purposes  and  to  minimize  taxable  income  in  the  same
reporting period (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Desai and Dharmapala 2009).
Prior studies showed that private firms are more likely to manage earnings in a
high  than  in  a  low  tax  alignment  environment  (Coppens  and  Peek  2005;
2Burgstahler et al. 2006; Goncharov and Zimmermann 2006; Van Tendeloo and
Vanstraelen 2008).
Third,  this  study  takes  advantage  of  the  Finnish  tax  reform  of  2005.
Following this reform, taxation at the corporate level was relaxed, and taxation
through dividend payments at the owner level was tightened. Previous studies
indicate that private Finnish firms adjusted their dividend policies in response
to the Finnish tax reform of 2005 with the aim of receiving tax benefits from the
more favorable dividend taxation system (Kari, Karikallio and Pirttilä 2008; Kari,
Karikallio and Pirttilä 2009; Harju and Matikka 2013). This study expands these
studies  by  examining  the  effects  of  the  Finnish  tax  reform  of  2005  on  the
earnings management of private firms. The owner-managers of private firms in
such settings have less discretion in minimizing both corporate taxes and
personal taxes through dividend payments simultaneously as they manage
earnings in response to the tax reform. Therefore, the Finnish tax reform of 2005
provides a unique opportunity to examine whether owners’ tax minimization
(through dividends) or corporate tax minimization affect the earnings
management when these incentives compete.
This study contributes to the prior literature on corporate tax rate changes
and earnings management that have thus far been limited to public firms in the
US with low tax alignment (Scholes et al. 1992; Guenther 1994; Lopez et al. 1998).
In addition, this study contributes to previous studies that have otherwise been
limited to the firm-level tax-induced earnings management of private firms in a
high tax alignment environment (Moreira 2006; Garrod, Ratej and Valentincic
2007; Marques, Rodrigues and Craig 2011; Steijvers and Niskanen 2011; Watrin,
Pott  and  Ullmann  2012).  This  study  also  participates  in  the  discussion  of  the
effects of dividend policy and dividend tax changes on corporate earnings
management, previously limited to public firms (Balachandran, Hanlon and Tu
2013; Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen 1996).
The results suggest that private firms do not manage earnings downwards in
the year prior to the effective date of the decrease in corporate tax rate, as has
been previously documented in similar cases. Instead, managers of private firms
opportunistically manage earnings upwards to receive tax benefits from the
more favorable dividend taxation system. The results hold for both the analysis
of signed and unsigned earnings management based on abnormal working
capital and total accruals. The results also indicate that smaller private
companies were more opportunistic in this sense than larger private companies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
Finnish institutional setting in detail and develops the hypotheses by utilizing
the  Finnish  tax  reform  of  2005  as  a  natural  experiment;  Section  3  describes  the
research design; Section 4 presents the main results and the sensitivity analyses;
and Section 5 discusses the results and presents the conclusions.
32 The Finnish tax reform of
2005 and development of the
hypotheses
In  2005,  a  tax reform was implemented in  Finland.  Two notable  changes in  the
taxation of private firms were introduced through this reform: from 2004 to 2005.
First, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 29 percent to 26 percent. Second,
the full dividend imputation system that private firms had used was
concurrently  abandoned  during  the  years  2005  and  2006.  In  the  full  dividend
imputation  system,  owners  did  not  pay  taxes  other  than  firm  tax  on  their
dividends, so that after the abandonment of this system, dividends became
partially double-taxed. Because the Finnish tax reform of 2005 abandoned the
full  dividend  imputation  system  gradually,  in  2005,  about  57  percent  of
dividends were taxable, and since 2006, 70 percent of dividends were taxable.
Based  on  the  discussion  of  the  effects  of  corporate  tax  rate  changes  on
earnings management (Scholes et al. 1992; Guenther 1994; Lopez et al. 1998), the
Finnish tax reform of 2005 would give private firms an incentive to manage
earnings downwards in  the year  prior  to  the effective date  of  the corporate  tax
rate  decrease  in  order  to  retain  some  “tax-free”  earnings  that  otherwise  would
be  taxed  with  higher  corporate  tax  rate  to  the  subsequent  periods.  However,
managers who control operations in privately held firms may also manage
earnings to achieve some personal earnings objective. Such an objective could be
the minimization of the personal tax through dividend payments. In this sense,
the Finnish tax reform of 2005 would give the managers of private firms an
incentive to manage earnings upwards in the year prior to the effective date of
the abandonment of a full-dividend imputation system 1 . This is because
managers may want to receive tax benefits from a more favorable dividend
taxation  system.  Thus,  the  incentives  described  above  are  conflicting  as  the
Finnish accounting environment gives the managers less discretion in
minimizing both corporate and owners’ taxes through dividend payments
1 In particular, earnings retained in 2004 were subject to dividend policy decisions in 2005, which
only partially tightened owners’ dividend taxation compared with the dividend tax policy as of 2006.
4simultaneously as they manage earnings in response to the Finnish tax reform of
2005 due to high tax alignment. Therefore, I predict the following:
H1: In cases where the minimization of corporate tax dominates the owners’
incentives  for  tax  minimization,  the  earnings  of  private  firms  are  more
managed downwards in 2004 (the year prior to the effective date of the
Finnish tax reform of 2005) than in other sample years.
H2: In cases where the owners’ incentives to minimize tax dominate the
corporate level incentives for tax minimization, the earnings of private firms
are more managed upwards in 2004 (the year prior to the effective date of the
Finnish tax reform of 2005) than in other sample years.
53 Research design
3.1  MEASUREMENTS OF CORPORATE EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT
In  this  study,  I  use  the  DeFond  and  Park  (2001)  model  to  estimate  abnormal
working capital accruals as proxy for the corporate earnings management of
private firms.2 DeFond and Park (2001) computed abnormal (or unexpected)
working capital accruals as the difference between observed working capital
accruals and expected working capital accruals at t (1):
Abnormal Working Capital Accruals = ∆WC − {[∆PWC / PS] × S} (1)
where
∆WC = the change in non-cash working capital (∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other
current assets − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities) from t − 1 to t
∆PWC = the change in non-cash working capital from t − 2 to t − 1
PS = annual sales revenue at t − 1
S = annual sales revenue at t
To  test  hypotheses  1  and  2,  the  following  equation  (2)  is  estimated  for  a  total
sample:
ABWCA = β0 + β1 I_2004 + β2 SIZE + β3 DEBT + β4 CFO + β5 LOSS
              + ∑ INDUSTRY + ε (2)
where ABWCA is  computed  as  the  signed  value  of  abnormal  working  capital
accruals obtained from (1) and is deflated by the total assets at the end of t − 1.
The test variable, I_2004, is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the
sample year is 2004 (the year prior to the effective date of the Finnish tax reform
of 2005) and zero if otherwise.
2 Industry-based models, such as modified Jones (1991) model, exclude industries with an
insufficient number of observations within a single year. Therefore, I use the DeFond and Park (2001)
model to estimate abnormal working capital accruals as an alternative model independent of
industry-year observations.
6The control variables for size (SIZE), leverage (DEBT), cash flow from operations
(CFO),  and loss (LOSS) are added into model because prior studies on earnings
management and overall accounting conservatism control these firm-specific
characteristics  (see  Reynolds  and  Francis  2001;  Ahmed,   Billings,  Morton  and
Stanford-Harris 2002; Wang 2006; Ahmed and Duellman 2007). SIZE equals the
natural  log  of  the  sum  of  year-end  total  assets  and  one. DEBT equals total
liabilities deflated by the total assets at the end of t. CFO equals cash flow from
operations at t deflated by the total  assets  at  the end of t − 1,  where  cash  flow
from  operations  is  computed  as  net  income  before  extraordinary  items  minus
accruals (= ∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other current assets [less cash or cash
equivalents] − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities − depreciation). LOSS is  an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if net earnings at t are negative and
zero if otherwise. In addition, indicators for three-digit NACE 3  codes
(INDUSTRY)  are  added  in  (2).  These  variables  are  not  reported  because  of  the
conciseness.
This study also takes into consideration the sign of corporate earnings
management; therefore, the predictions for the control variables have been taken
(inversely) from the previous studies on overall accounting conservatism
(Ahmed et al. 2002; Ahmed and Duellman 2007). Ahmed et al. (2002) showed
that bondholders in public US firms favor conservative reporting as it protects
them from the excessive dividend payments. I predict that leverage (DEBT) and
cash flow from operations (CFO) are negatively associated with signed earnings
management.
The test variable, I_2004,  was  based  on  time-series  (denotes  a  single  year);
therefore,  it  was important  to  investigate  whether  earnings were managed in a
time series within individual firm in response to the Finnish tax reform of 2005.
To do so, the fixed (within) effects (FE) regression coefficients were estimated in
addition  to  pooled  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  regression  estimates.  This
panel method controls for both observable and unobservable time-invariants
within firm on earnings management. Prior studies suggested that the greater
political  costs  in  larger  firms  may  enforce  them  to  report  more  conservative
earnings (see Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981;
Ahmed  et  al.  2002;  Ahmed  and  Duellman  2007).  However,  since  the  FE
regression  transforms  firm  size  (SIZE)  to  firm  growth  (equal  to  the  first
difference in firm size); I predict the negative pooled OLS and positive FE
coefficient for SIZE. I set prediction neither the intercept, nor LOSS.
DeFond and Park (2001) model has potential limitations that need to be
addressed further. The model presumes that prior year’s earnings were
unmanaged when estimating current years’ earnings management. Therefore,
3 NACE refers to the industrial classification used by Eurostat in Revision 1 and is an acronym of
Nomenclature generale des Activites economiques dans les Communautes europeennes.
7the  DeFond  and  Park  (2001)  model  may  be  insufficient  or  weak  in  detecting
earnings management in response to the Finnish tax reform of 2005. To add
robustness to the analysis, modified Jones (1991) model as alternative proxy for
earnings management is used. Prior studies suggest that modified Jones (1991)
model was the best proxy to detect earnings management relative to other
earnings management measures (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Based on
this  model  (3),  the  observed  total  accruals  (TA)  are  a  function  of  lagged  assets
(A); the difference between the change in revenues (∆REV) and the change in net
receivables (∆REC); and the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE):
TA = γ0 + γ1 (1/A) + γ2 (∆REV − ∆REC ) + γ3 PPE + η (3)
where
TA = total accruals at t deflated by the total assets at the end of t − 1, where total
accruals are computed as the change in non-cash working capital (∆inventory +
∆debtors + ∆other current assets − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities) from t
− 1 to t, minus depreciation at t
A = total assets at the end of t − 1
∆REV = the change in sales revenue from t − 1 to t, deflated by the total assets at
the end of t − 1
∆REC = the change in net receivables from t − 1 to t, deflated by the total assets
at the end of t − 1
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment deflated by the total assets at the end
of t − 1
Abnormal total accruals  at t (η) and deflated by the total assets at the end of t –
1 are obtained as the difference between the observed total accruals (TA) and an
estimate of the normal total accruals obtained from (3) separately estimated by a
two-digit NACE code and fiscal year.4  To test hypotheses 1 and 2, the following
equation (4) is estimated for a total sample:
ABTA = δ0 + δ1 I_2004 + δ2 SIZE + δ3 DEBT + δ4 CFO + δ5 LOSS
+ ε (4)
where ABTA is the signed value of abnormal total accruals and deflated by the
total assets at the end of t – 1, obtained from (3). The test variable, I_2004, and
control  variables  (other  than industry dummies,  which are  excluded in [4])  are
defined above. The predictions for the coefficient on I_2004 and control variables
in (4) equal to those described above.
4 I require each two-digit NACE code and year combination to have at least 30 observations in each
industry-year regressions.
8Heteroscedasticity can invalidate the statistical tests of significance in the
regression analysis if the modeled error terms are correlated, abnormally
distributed, and the variances of errors are inconstant. In time series regressions,
the existence of serial correlation may also invalidate the statistical tests of
significance if the modeled errors are correlated in time series. Therefore, all
regressions presented in this paper are based on a covariance matrix estimator
that is robust for heteroscedasticity (White 1980) and provides cluster robust
standard errors within firm.
3.2  SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample was collected from the AMADEUS database, which is maintained
by  Bureau  van  Dijk.  I  focused  on  the  financial  statements  of  Finnish  private
limited firms available for the period from 2002 to 2009. Several additional filters
were applied; for example, only firms with available information on financial
statements including taxation were selected for further sample selection.5 This
criterion yielded 105,001 firm-year observations (13,482 individual firms). I
further excluded private firms that were operating in financial or insurance
sectors  because  their  financial  statements  would  likely  differ  from  those
operating in other sectors. Finally, after eliminating anomalies in financial
statement  items,  and  after  excluding  one  percent  of  extreme  values  for  all
continuous variables employed in (1), (2), (3), and (4), the final sample consisted
of 70,128 firm-year observations (13,164 individual firms) for (2); and 78,127
firm-year observations (12,841 individual firms) for (4).
5 In the sample period, most limited private Finnish firms were obligated to audit their financial
statements with the exception that only very small firms (total assets less than  €100 thousand) were
not obligated to audit their financial statements in the later sample years (since the change in audit
requirement criteria in June 2007). Therefore, I did not set any size criteria for Finnish private firms.
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4.1  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and comparisons of the univariate
means of the accounting variables of private firms in a sample from 2004 and
sample years other than 2004 (2005–09); and the descriptive statistics of a total
sample in (2). Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and comparisons of the
univariate  means of  the accounting variables  of  private  firms in  a  sample from
2004 and sample years other than 2004 (2003, 2005–09); it also presents the
descriptive  statistics  of  a  total  sample  in  (4).  These  results  provide  further
evidence  of  the  need  to  control  leverage,  cash  flow  from  operations,  and  firm
size in the regression analysis presented in the next section.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables employed in (2) excluding industry
Panel A: Observations in 2004 (N = 11,460; n = 11,460)
Variable WCA ABWCA NABWCA SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
Mean 0.0104 0.0035 0.1733 1317.2 0.4766 0.2185 0.0693
SD 0.0981 0.2380 0.1631 3783.9 0.2473 0.2257
1st percentile −0.2791 −0.6514 0.0019 26.0 0.0400 −0.2495
Median 0.0060 0.0043 0.1224 320.0 0.4688 0.1858
99th percentile 0.3554 0.6449 0.7175 20610.0 0.9723 0.9141
Panel B: Observations between 2005 and 2009 (N = 58,668; n = 13,089)
Variable WCA ABWCA NABWCA SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
Mean 0.0091 −0.0047 0.1597 1540.3 0.4269 0.2010 0.0689
SD 0.0967 0.2214 0.1534 4011.3 0.2458 0.2114
1st percentile −0.2897 −0.6293 0.0016 30.0 0.0316 −0.2367
Median 0.0062 −0.0021 0.1110 411.8 0.4016 0.1688
99th percentile 0.3294 0.5997 0.6949 22183.9 0.9584 0.8830
Panel C: All observations between 2004 and 2009 (N = 70,128; n = 13,164)
Variable WCA ABWCA NABWCA SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
Mean 0.0094 −0.0034 0.1619 1503.9 0.4351 0.2039 0.0690
SD 0.0969 0.2242 0.1551 3975.8 0.2468 0.2139
1st percentile −0.2877 −0.6342 0.0017 29.0 0.0325 −0.2384
Median 0.0062 −0.0011 0.1127 395.0 0.4127 0.1713
99th percentile 0.3334 0.6082 0.7012 21901.2 0.9612 0.8889
t-statisticsa −1.29 −3.60 −8.60 5.50 −19.75 −7.98 0.14
Descriptive statistics and univariate mean comparisons of accounting variables of private firms in
2004 and sample years other than 2004 for (2). The total sample consists of 70,128 annual
observations for 13,164 private firms between 2004 and 2009. The test variable, I_2004, equals
an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the sample  year  is  2004  (the  year  before  the
effective date of  tax rate  reduction)  and 0 if  otherwise. WCA equals working capital accruals at t
deflated by the total assets at the end of t − 1, where working capital accruals are computed as
the change in non-cash working capital (∆inventory +  ∆debtors +  ∆other current assets −
∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities). ABWCA equals signed abnormal working capital accruals
obtained from the DeFond and Park (2001) model at t, and deflated by the total assets at the end
of t − 1. NABWCA equals naturalized (absolute) value of ABWCA. SIZE equals total assets at the
end of t, € thousand. DEBT equals total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of t. CFO equals
cash flow from operations at t deflated by the total  assets  at  the end of t − 1,  where cash flow
from  operations  is  computed  as  net  income  before  extraordinary  items  minus  accruals  (=
∆inventory +  ∆debtors +  ∆other current assets [less cash or cash equivalents] − ∆creditors −
∆other current liabilities − depreciation). LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if
net earnings at t are negative and 0 if otherwise.at-statistics for two-tailed test of difference
between the sample means of 2004 and other sample years than 2004. Significant at 10% level or
better are denoted by boldface characters, respectively.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables employed in (4)
Panel A: Observations in 2004 (N = 10,903; n = 10,903)
Variable TA ABTA NABTA SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
Mean −0.0569 −0.0003 0.1153 1100.1 0.4686 0.2164 0.0685
SD 0.1722 0.1570 0.1065 2924.0 0.2472 0.2236
1st percentile −0.5305 −0.4126 0.0013 27.8 0.0367 −0.2622
Median −0.0522 −0.0030 0.0828 314.7 0.4591 0.1865
99th percentile 0.3983 0.4368 0.4806 14679.0 0.9710 0.8986
Panel B: Observations in 2003 and between 2005 and 2009 (N = 67,224; n = 12,821)
Variable TA ABTA NABTA SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
Mean −0.0509 −0.0003 0.1054 1201.4 0.4277 0.2020 0.0713
SD 0.1591 0.1463 0.1014 2880.5 0.2465 0.2109
1st percentile −0.5106 −0.4205 0.0013 30.0 0.0307 −0.2449
Median −0.0450 −0.0006 0.0747 377.1 0.4026 0.1710
99th percentile 0.3716 0.4036 0.4767 14326.0 0.9595 0.8763
Panel C: All observations between 2004 and 2009 (N = 78,127; n = 12,841)
Variable TA ABTA NABTA SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
Mean −0.0518 −0.0003 0.1068 1187.3 0.4334 0.2040 0.0709
SD 0.1610 0.1478 0.1022 2886.8 0.2470 0.2128
1st percentile −0.5132 −0.4187 0.0013 29.0 0.0311 −0.2465
Median −0.0461 −0.0009 0.0758 368.0 0.4108 0.1728
99th percentile 0.3760 0.4070 0.4773 14351.7 0.9612 0.8788
t-statisticsa 3.57 −0.00 −9.32 3.40 −16.07 −6.54 1.06
Descriptive statistics and univariate mean comparisons of accounting variables of private firms in
2004  and  sample  years  other  than  2004  for  (4).  The  total  sample consists of 78,127 annual
observations for 12,841 private firms between 2003 and 2009. The test variable, I_2004, equals
an indicator  variable  that  takes the value of  1  if  the sample year  is  2004 (the year  before the
effective date of tax rate reduction) and 0 if otherwise. TA equals total accruals at t deflated by
the total assets at the end of t − 1, where total accruals are computed as the change in non-cash
working capital (∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other current assets − ∆creditors − ∆other current
liabilities), minus depreciation at t. ABTA equals signed value of abnormal accruals obtained from
modified Jones (1991) model  at t,  and deflated by the total  assets  at  the end of t – 1. NABTA
equals naturalized (absolute) value of ABTA. SIZE equals total assets at the end of t, € thousand.
DEBT equals total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of t. CFO equals  cash flow from
operations at t deflated by the total assets at the end of t − 1, where cash flow from operations
is computed as net income before extraordinary items minus accruals (= ∆inventory + ∆debtors
+ ∆other current assets [less cash or cash equivalents] − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities −
depreciation). LOSS is  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  net  earnings  at t are
negative, and 0 otherwise. at-statistics for two-tailed test of difference between the sample
means of 2004 and other sample years than 2004. Significant at 10% level or better are denoted
by boldface characters, respectively.
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Panel  A  and  Panel  B  of  Table  3  present  the  Pearson  (Spearman)  correlation
coefficients below and above the diagonal for variables employed in (2) and (4)
excluding industry. The correlation coefficients indicate that I_2004 was
significantly positively associated with unsigned earnings management.
Additionally, the correlation coefficients indicate that I_2004 was significantly
positively associated with signed abnormal working capital accruals. However,
the correlation coefficients between ABTA and I_2004 were insignificant. If the
correlation coefficients between the two or more independent variables in a
multiple regression model are greater than 0.8, multicollinearity may bias the
regression results. Table 3 shows that none of the correlations coefficients
between the independent variables exceeded this threshold; therefore, the
possibility that the regressions results presented in the next section are biased
due to multicollinearity can be precluded.
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Table 3: The correlation coefficients for variables employed in (2) and (4) excluding industry
Panel A: The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) a diagonal for
variables employed in (2): N = 70,128; n = 13,164; 2004–2009
Variable NABWCA ABWCA I_2004 SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
NABWCA 1.0000 −0.0165* 0.0300* −0.1425* 0.0423* 0.0936* 0.0055
ABWCA −0.0403* 1.0000 0.0131* −0.0066* −0.0187* −0.4549* −0.0496*
I_2004 0.0357* 0.0125* 1.0000 −0.0640* 0.0744* 0.0295* 0.0005
SIZE −0.1389* −0.0018 −0.0463* 1.0000 0.1010* −0.1225* −0.0698*
DEBT 0.0502* −0.0158* 0.0566* 0.0910* 1.0000 −0.1042* 0.1458*
CFO 0.1400* −0.4674* 0.0232* −0.1316* −0.0800* 1.0000 −0.2285*
LOSS 0.0113* −0.0436* −0.0015 −0.0732* 0.1706* −0.2092* 1.0000
Panel B: The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) a diagonal for
variables employed in (4): N = 78,127; n = 12,841; 2003–2009
Variable NABTA ABTA I_2004 SIZE DEBT CFO LOSS
NABTA 1.0000 0.0014 0.0331* −0.1127* 0.0574* 0.0609* 0.0278*
ABTA −0.0073* 1.0000 −0.0054 0.0158* −0.0712* −0.5832* −0.1005*
I_2004 0.0320* 0.0000 1.0000 −0.0434* 0.0578* 0.0236* −0.0038
SIZE −0.1048* 0.0119* −0.0395* 1.0000 0.0795* −0.1190* −0.0736*
DEBT 0.0553* −0.0749* 0.0568* 0.0831* 1.0000 −0.1146* 0.1463*
CFO 0.1188* −0.6015* 0.0233* −0.1187* −0.0999* 1.0000 −0.2308*
LOSS 0.0354* −0.0945* −0.0058* −0.0753* 0.1644* −0.2188* 1.0000
This table reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below or above a diagonal for
variables employed in (2) and (4), excluding industry. The extreme 1% on values for each
continuous variable are excluded. NABWCA equals naturalized (absolute) value of ABWCA, where
ABWCA equals signed value of abnormal working capital accruals obtained from the DeFond and
Park (2001) model at t,  and  deflated  by  the  total  assets  at  the  end  of t – 1. NABTA equals
naturalized (absolute) value of ABTA, where ABTA equals signed value of abnormal total accruals
obtained from modified Jones (1991) model at t, and deflated by the total assets at the end of t –
1. I_2004 is an indicator variable that takes the value of  1  if  the sample year  is  2004 and 0 if
otherwise. SIZE equals the natural log of the sum of year-end total assets and one. DEBT equals
total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of t. CFO equals cash flow from operations at t
deflated by the total assets at the end of t − 1, where cash flow from operations is computed as
net income before extraordinary items minus accruals (= ∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other current
assets [less cash or cash equivalents] − ∆creditors  − ∆other current liabilities − depreciation).
LOSS equals an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if net earnings at t are negative and 0
if otherwise. Significant at the 10% (*) level (two-tailed) or better, respectively.
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4.2  TESTING H1 AND H2
Table 4 presents the pooled OLS and FE (within) regression coefficient estimates
for  (2)  and  (4)  using  a  total  sample.  The  pooled  OLS  regression  coefficients  on
I_2004 were positive and statistically significant. The FE (within) regression
coefficients on I_2004 also were positive and statistically significant. In the
pooled  OLS  regression  coefficient  estimates,  the  adjusted  R- squared for (2)
denotes  that  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  is  25.98  percent;  and  the
adjusted R-squared for (4) denotes that an explanatory power of a model was
44.04 percent. For the FE (within) regression coefficient estimates, the within R-
squared  for  (2)  denotes  that  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model  was  36.79
percent; and the within R- squared for (4) denotes that the explanatory power of
the model was 55.73 percent. These results imply that the FE estimates are better
predictors for tax-induced earnings management in response to the Finnish tax
reform of 2005.
Based on the results presented in Table 4, since β1 is significantly positive as
predicted by hypothesis 2, hypothesis 2 is accepted and hypothesis 1 is rejected.
These results suggest that earnings are rather managed upwards than
downwards to minimize owners’ rather than corporate tax in 2004 as a response
to the tax reform.
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Table 4: Testing H1 and H2: signed corporate earnings management in response to the Finnish
tax reform of 2005 using a total sample
Dependent variable
Independent (2) ABWCA (4) ABTA
Variables Prediction OLS FE OLS FE
Intercept ? 0.1676 0.0389 0.1830 0.1007
(29.72)*** (1.75)* (65.39)*** (9.44)***
I_2004 −/+ H1/H2 0.0173 0.0258 0.0076 0.0155
(8.47)*** (11.46)*** (6.96)*** (14.41)***
SIZE ? −0.0096 0.0184 −0.0086 0.0117
(−17.81)*** (5.03)*** (−22.01)*** (6.64)***
DEBT ? −0.0294 0.0289 −0.0637 −0.1040
(−10.27)*** (3.33)*** (−29.92)*** (−23.38)***
CFO ? −0.5585 −0.7826 −0.4694 −0.5828
(−98.33)*** (−126.06)*** (−128.10)*** (−162.10)***
LOSS ? −0.1392 −0.1735 −0.1319 −0.1397
(−44.86)*** (48.85)*** (−70.91)*** (−72.81)***
INDUSTRY (not reported) No No No
Adjusted R-squared 25.98% 44.04%
Within R-squared 36.79% 55.73%
N 70,128 70,128 78,127 78,127
n 13,164 13,164 12,841 12,841
Years 2004–09 2004–09 2003–09 2003–09
This  table  reports  the  pooled  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  and  fixed (within) effects  (FE)
regression  coefficient  estimates  for  (2)  and  (4)  for  a  total  sample.  The  pooled  OLS  regression
coefficient estimates for (2) include indicators for three-digit NACE codes (INDUSTRY). For brevity
proposes these indicator variables are not reported. The regression excludes extreme 1% values
for each continuous variable. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust with respect to
residuals corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980) and serial correlation within firm (cluster
robust standard errors). The test variable, I_2004, equals an indicator variable that takes the
value  of  1  if  a  sample  year  is  2004,  and  0  otherwise. ABWCA equals signed value of abnormal
working capital  accruals  obtained from the DeFond and Park (2001) model  at t, and deflated by
the total assets at the end of t – 1. ABTA equals signed value of abnormal total accruals obtained
from modified Jones (1991) model at t, and deflated by the total assets at the end of t – 1. SIZE
equals the  natural  log  of  the  sum of  year-end  total  assets  and  one. DEBT equals total liabilities
divided by total assets at the end of t. CFO equals cash flow from operations at t deflated by the
total assets at the end of t − 1, where cash flow from operations is computed as net income before
extraordinary items minus accruals (= ∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other current assets [less cash
or cash equivalents] − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities − depreciation). LOSS is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if net earnings at t are negative and 0 if otherwise. Significant at
the 10% (*); 5% (**); and 1 % (***) level (two-tailed), respectively.
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4.3  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: UNSIGNED EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE
To  add  robustness  to  the  analysis,  the  additional  test  using  absolute  earnings
management as dependent variable was executed. The OLS regression assumes
that the values of dependent variable are normally distributed. Therefore, I used
the truncated regression coefficient estimates since the explanatory variables
(NABWCA in [2]; and NABTA in [4]) have only absolute (naturalized) values in
the analysis of unsigned earnings management as dependent variable. To
examine whether earnings were managed upwards or downwards in response
to  the  Finnish  tax  reform  of  2005,  I  added  an  interacting  term  for I_2004 and
indicator for signed earnings management (I_NABWCA for [2]; I_ NABTA for [4],
that  equals  one  for  firm-years  with  upwards  managed  earnings  and  zero  if
otherwise). The untabulated results of this additional test confirmed that the
main results presented in Table 4 are insensitive to the alternative model
specification.
4.4  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: CONTROLLING FOR SIZE
WITHIN TWO TIME SERIES CATEGORIES
Since the data did not contain managerial ownership information, I cannot
preclude the possibility that the managers’ and owners’ incentives were not
always aligned in a sample, which however, is quite unlikely in privately owned
firms. Implicitly, in smaller private firms typically managed by the
entrepreneurs, the incentives of owner-managers for personal tax minimization
are stronger than in larger private firms with more dispersed ownership
structure. Prior studies suggested that the greater political costs in larger firms
may enforce them to report more conservative earnings (see Watts and
Zimmerman 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981; Ahmed et al. 2002; Ahmed
and Duellman 2007). Therefore, large firms may have lower incentives to act on
behalf of owners by managing earnings upwards in response to the Finnish tax
reform  of  2005  as  they  face  greater  political  costs  forcing  them  to  report  more
conservative earnings.
To check whether the results presented in Table 4 are sensitive to private firm
size; an additional sensitivity analysis to allow differences in the coefficients on
SIZE between  the  samples  of  2004  and  other  years  than  2004  was  executed.
Therefore, I re-ran (2) and (4) by adding an interaction term for I_2004 and SIZE;
and predict that the negative association between firm sizes and signed earnings
management is greater in 2004 than in other sample years. Thus the coefficients
on SIZE and I_2004 × SIZE are  predicted  to  be  negative.  Table  5  presents  the
OLS regression results of this additional test. As predicted, the pooled OLS
regression coefficients on SIZE and I_2004 × SIZE were significantly negative.
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Overall, the sensitivity analysis showed that the results presented in Table 4 are
sensitive to the differences in firm size.
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: controlling for size within two time series categories
Independent Dependent variable
Variables Prediction (2) ABWCA (4) ABTA
Intercept ? 0.1639 0.1799
(28.52)*** (62.71)***
I_2004 −/+ H1/H2 0.0397 0.0298
(4.30)*** (5.79)***
SIZE − −0.0090 −0.0080
(−15.75)*** (−19.98)***
I_2004 × SIZE − −0.0038 −0.0038
(−2.65)*** (−4.66)***
DEBT ? −0.0296 −0.0638
(−10.33)*** (−29.97)***
CFO ? −0.5588 −0.4696
(−98.29)*** (−128.13)***
LOSS ? −0.1391 −0.1319
(−44.86)*** (−70.90)***
INDUSTRY (not reported) No
Adjusted R-squared 25.99% 44.06%
N 70,128 78,127
n 13,164 12,841
Years 2004–09 2003–09
This  table  reports  the pooled OLS regression coefficient  estimates for  (2)  and (4)  adding an
interaction term, I_2004 × SIZE, using a total sample. Indicators for three-digit NACE codes
(INDUSTRY) are added in (2). For brevity proposes these indicator variables are not reported.
The regression excludes extreme 1% values for each continuous variable. The t-statistics
reported in parentheses are robust with respect to residuals corrected for heteroscedasticity
(White  1980)  and  serial  correlation  within  firm  (cluster  robust  standard  errors).  The  test
variable, I_2004,  equals  an  indicator  variable  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  a sample year is
2004, and 0 otherwise. ABWCA equals signed value of abnormal working capital accruals
obtained from the DeFond and Park (2001) model at t, and deflated by the total assets at the
end of t – 1. ABTA equals signed value of abnormal total accruals obtained from modified
Jones (1991) model at t, and deflated by the total assets at the end of t – 1. SIZE equals the
natural log of the sum of year-end total assets and one. DEBT equals total liabilities divided by
total  assets  at  the end of t. CFO equals  cash flow from operations at t deflated by the total
assets at the end of t − 1, where cash flow from operations is computed as net income before
extraordinary items minus accruals (= ∆inventory + ∆debtors + ∆other current assets [less
cash or cash equivalents] − ∆creditors − ∆other current liabilities − depreciation). LOSS is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if net earnings at t are negative and 0 if otherwise.
Significant at the 10% (*); 5% (**); and 1 % (***) level (two-tailed), respectively.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
This study investigates whether incentives for corporates or owners to minimize
taxes affect the earnings management when these incentives compete in private
firms. This study utilizes as a natural experiment the Finnish tax reform of 2005
that reduced corporate tax rates from 29 percent to 26 percent and gradually
abandoned the full dividend imputation system that private companies had
used previously. The findings showed that tax-induced earnings management is
driven  by  owners’  incentives  more  than  by  firm  incentives.  Specifically,  the
findings showed, as opposed to previously documented findings, that private
companies manage earnings upwards but not downwards prior to the decreased
tax rate in order to benefit from the more favorable dividend taxation system.
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis revealed that incentives for owner’s tax
minimization through managing earnings in response to the tax reform became
stronger  with  decreasing  private  firm  size,  as  a  proxy  for  the  strength  of
managerial self-interest through implicit ownership concentration.
The results  of  this  study suggest  that  the corporate  tax rate  reductions may
not be as influential tax motives on financial reporting in the case with strong
owner incentives in private firms. This is contrast to what has been documented
previously for corporate tax rate changes in public firms. Thus, this study sheds
light on how managerial opportunism manifested in the form of tax
minimization on behalf of owners dominate the resource allocations of private
firms and hence lead to postponed corporate tax benefits (retained tax-free
earnings).
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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether auditor gender has an impact on the magnitude
of corporate earnings management in small and medium-sized private Finnish
firms.  We  examine  the  association  between  auditor  gender  and  earnings
management of private firms by means of multiple linear regression analysis. In
our analysis we use discretionary accruals (DACC) estimated by using the cross-
sectional version of the Jones (1991) model as a measure for corporate earnings
management. When we regress the absolute (unsigned) earnings management
on gender and a set of control variables, we find that female auditors allow for
more discretion in income reporting. When the analysis is conducted separately
for sub-samples of income increasing and income decreasing discretionary
accruals, the results suggest that female auditors are more conservative. This
study has been conducted by using data from one country. Since it is commonly
known that the role of females in the society varies from one country to the next
more research is needed in different social environments. When selecting
auditors, management should pay attention also to the gender of the auditor. It
may also be useful for stakeholders to pay attention to the gender of the auditors
that they engage or the gender distribution of the audit team. Our results imply
that gender diversity in the auditing profession may improve the quality of
financial statement overall. This study is the first one that investigates the effect
that  auditor  gender  may  has  on  actual  earnings  management  behavior.  It  also
adds to the understanding on earnings management in private firms.
Keywords: auditor gender; earnings management; private firms
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1 Introduction
Corporate earnings management has been one of the most extensively
researched areas in financial accounting and finance during the last few decades.
By managing earnings, management hides the true earnings and financial
position of the firm through inappropriate use of discretionary accruals.
According to the definition by Healy and Wahlen (1999), firms involved in
earnings management in their financial reports attempt to mislead some
stakeholders about the performance of the firm, or to influence the outcomes of
the firm’s contracts which are based on accounting numbers.
There are several types of earnings management. The early empirical
research concentrates on the income smoothing type of earnings management
by which the firms attempt to give the shareholders and lenders the impression
that they are low risk firms. (Beidleman, 1973; Ronen and Sadan, 1981). The
contracting view of the positive accounting theory provides more specific
hypotheses for the occurrence and direction of earnings management in certain
contexts (Kasanen et al., 1996). Several of the firms' contracts are either explicitly
or implicitly based on accounting numbers. Explicit contracts examined in
accounting literature include management compensation, (Healy, 1985), debt
covenants (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) and taxation (Guenther, 1994). Implicit
accounting based contracts include, e.g., management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1986)
and labour union contract negotiations (Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986).
Recently, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b) and Kinnunen et al. (2000) find
that seasoned equity issuers (as well as issuers of initial public offerings) tend to
increase reported earnings by increasing discretionary accruals.
The aim of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  auditor  gender  has  an effect
on the magnitude of corporate earnings management in small and medium-
sized private Finnish firms. That is, we examine if there are differences between
firms audited by male and female auditors. Although earnings management
literature, gender literature and auditing literature are all extensive as such with
points of contact with many other disciplines, we are not aware of any previous
studies  on  the  effect  that  auditor  gender  may  have  on  actual  earnings
management behavior.
Only few previous studies combine gender and earnings management,
overall. There have been some attempts to investigate the impact that gender
has on the attitudes towards earnings management by using surveys targeted at
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accounting students. The results indicate that gender is not a decisive issue in
this context. Others have investigated the impact that gender diversity in
corporate management has on earnings quality. If it holds what has been argued
in the gender literature that women are more risk averse and conservative (e.g.,
Byrnes & Miller, 1999) we expect to find less opportunistic earnings
management behavior in firms audited by women.
Most  prior  studies  on  earnings  management  have  concentrated  on  large
listed firms. However, recently an increasing number of studies have focused on
the  earnings  quality  of  small  and  medium-sized  private  firms,  e.g.,  Beatty  and
Harris (1999), Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Becker et
al. (1998) and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) both concentrate on the
effect of audit quality on earnings management in private firms.
The  Finnish  institutional  setting  provides  an  excellent  environment  for
investigating the role  that  auditor  gender  has.  In  Finland auditors  are  required
to  personally  sign  the  auditor’s  reports  on  behalf  of  the  audit  firm.  This  is  in
contrast to many other institutional settings such as the U.S. and U.K., where
auditors  are  not  required to  personally  sign the auditor’s  reports,  but  the firms
are  obligated  to  publish  the  name  of  the  audit  firm  responsible  for  the  audit.
Hence,  Finnish  data  enables  us  to  identify  the  auditor’s  gender  and  other
features related to the auditor’s person.
Our results concerning gender differences in audit practices are twofold. First,
when we regress  absolute  (unsigned)  discretionary accruals  (estimated using a
cross-sectional variation of the Jones, 1991, model) on a gender dummy and a set
of  control  variables,  we  find  that  female  auditors  allow  for  more  discretion  in
income reporting than their male colleagues. When the analysis is conducted
separately for income increasing and income decreasing discretionary accruals,
it appears that the coefficient of the gender dummy is positive and significant
only in the sub-sample of income decreasing absolute discretionary accruals.
The results for the total sample of unsigned discretionary accruals thus seem to
be  driven  by  the  income  decreasing  discretionary  accruals,  which  suggests
higher conservatism of female auditors.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the effect that
gender has on business behaviour. In the subsequent section, we present the
data  and  empirical  method  to  be  used  in  the  analysis.  Finally,  we  present  and
discuss our results.
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2 Gender and business
behavior
A number of studies have investigated the differences that gender imposes on
different aspects of behavior in individuals. It has been widely agreed, that at
least  in  the  general  population,  women  are  more  risk  averse  (Byrnes  &  Miller,
1999) and less overconfident than men. Similar results are obtained when the
sample  has  been  limited  to  the  field  of  accounting  and  finance  (Sunden  &
Surette, 1998; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Olsen & Cox, 2001; Graham et al.,
2002; Dwyer et al., 2002; Watson & Robinson, 2003; Watson & McNaughton,
2007).  Women also seem to be less overconfident on financial matters than men
(Johnson & Powell, 1994; Barber & Odean, 2001; Bliss & Potter, 2002; Schubert,
2006).
Some studies suggest that women behave more ethically than men, while
others  find  no  gender  differences  in  ethical  behaviour  (for  review  of  this
literature  see  Ford  &  Richardson,  1994).  Women  are  also  observed  to  be  more
ethical in a business context (Ruegger & King, 1992; Khazanchi, 1995; Eynon et
al.,  1997).  Roxas and Stoneback (2004)  agree that  overall,  women are  less  likely
to engage in unethical behaviour, but when the country context is taken into
account,  gender  based differences  are  significant  only in  some countries.  Other
studies  suggest  that  women are  less  likely to  engage in  unethical  behaviour in
the work place to gain financial rewards (Betz et al., 1989; Bernardi & Arnold,
1997).
Only a few studies combine gender and earnings management overall.
Clikeman et al. (2001) use data from a survey targeted at accounting students to
investigate whether gender and national origin has an impact on attitudes
towards common methods to manage earnings. Their results indicate that
gender  is  not  a  decisive  issue  in  this  context.  Krishnan  and  Parsons  (2006)
investigate actual earnings management behavior in a sample of Fortune 500
companies  and  find  that  earnings  quality  is  positively  associated  with  gender
diversity in corporate management. Gul et al. (2007) use data on S&P 500
companies  and  find  that  firms  with  female  directors  on  the  board  exhibit
significantly lower earnings management and higher accruals quality than the
firms with no female directors.
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The role that female auditors play in the auditing profession has been given
an  increasing  amount  of  attention  lately,  but  the  results  are  still  somewhat
ambiguous.  Gold  et  al.  (2009)  provide  evidence  that  female  auditors  are  more
risk-averse  than  their  male  counterparts  in  auditor  judgement.  Bernardi  and
Arnold (1997) find that women in Big 5 accounting firms perform better than
their male colleagues in moral development. Ittonen et al. (2008) investigate the
association between female audit committee representation and audit fees. Their
central  result  is  that  audit  fees  are  lower  in  firms  with  female  audit  firm
representation. Owhoso (2002), however, finds no gender differences among
auditors with the same experience in detecting fraud risk in audit planning.
Overall, the psychological gender differences and previous evidence on
gender differences in the auditing profession imply that female auditors may
invest  more  effort  in  audit  planning  and  the  audit  process  for  detecting  and
preventing earnings management. As a result, we would observe female
auditors restricting opportunistic earnings management more effectively than
male auditors.
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3 Methodology and data
3.1 THE FINNISH CONTEXT
Similar  to  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Germany,  the  certification  of  auditors  in
Finland is characterized by a two-tier system (Niemi, 2004). First-tier certified
auditors, KHT-auditors, are authorized and controlled by the Auditing Board of
Central Chamber of Commerce. Second-tier certified auditors, HTM-auditors,
are authorized and controlled by the Auditing Committees of regional
Chambers of Commerce. Both are supervised by the Central Chamber of
Commerce. Approximately 28.5 percent of KHT-auditors in Finland are female
(Source: Annual report 2004/2005, The Finnish Institute of Authorized Public
Accountants).  A  special  feature  of  the  audit  markets  in  Finland  in  our  study
period is that, in addition to these two tiers of certified auditors, some small and
medium-sized  firms  in  Finland  were  allowed  to  have  audit  services  by
uncertified “third-tier” auditors while larger firms were obligated to have
certified auditors (HTM or KHT) depending on legally predetermined size-
limits (see, e.g., Niemi, 2004, Knechel, Niemi and Sundgren, 2008).
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
We examine the association between auditor gender and earnings management
of private firms by means of multiple linear regression analysis. In our analysis
we use discretionary accruals (DACC) estimated by using the cross-sectional
version of the Jones (1991) model as a measure for corporate earnings
management  (see  e.g.,  DeFond  &  Subramanyam,  1998;  Reynolds  &  Francis,
2000). Dechow et al. (1995) test the different approaches of estimating
nondiscretionary accruals. They find that the modified Jones (1991) model
performs best especially in detecting upward earnings management. This is the
primary methodology used in this study.
The cross-sectional Jones model estimates normal accruals as a function of a
change in sales and level of gross property, plant, and equipment. The amount
of discretionary accruals is obtained as the difference between observed accruals
and an estimate of the Jones model. The Jones model is specified as follows:
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TAit/Ait-1 = β0 + β1(1/Ait-1) + β2(∆SALESit/Ait-1) + β3(PPEit/Ait-1) + εit                           (1)
where
TAit = total accruals for firm i for year t;
Ait-1 = total assets for firm i for year t-1;
∆SALESit = change in sales for firm i for year t;
PPEit = gross property plant and equipment for firm i for year t and
εit = error term;
The  Jones  model  is  separately  estimated  for  each  industry  (based  on  two-digit
SIC) and year combination. Total accruals is measured from balance sheet data
and defined as a change in non-cash current assets minus a change in current
liabilities excluding the current portion of long-term debt minus depreciation
and amortization. A measure of discretionary accruals (DACC) is obtained as an
error term from the estimated Jones model. To mitigate effects of outliers on
estimates of discretionary accruals, the Jones model is estimated using truncated
variables which exclude observations outside the 1th and 99th percentiles.
To test whether auditor’s gender has an impact on the magnitude of earnings
management among private firms we estimate the following regression model
from panel data:
ACCRUALit = η0 + η1 GENDERit + η2 NonCERT it + η3 BIG_4it + η4 TWOorMOREit
+ η5 LAWit + η6 CFOit + η7 LogSALESit + η8 DTAit + εit                                               (2)
The  dependent  variable  ACCRUAL  is  either  the  absolute  (unsigned)  value  of
total accruals scaled by lagged assets (TACC), or the absolute (unsigned) value
of discretionary accruals estimated using the Jones model and scaled by lagged
assets  (DACC).  As  the  main  test  variable,  the  Model  (2)  includes  a  dummy
variable GENDER indicating audits in which at least one responsible auditor is
female.
Model (2) also includes control variables for audit quality and earnings
management. In Finland actual audit quality may depend on whether or not an
auditor has a professional certification (Sundgren, 1998) and, therefore, we
include  an  indicator  for  audits  by  noncertified  auditors  (NONCERT).  Previous
studies show that at least in the context of U.S. listed firms, Big 4 audit firms are
more effective in restricting corporate earnings management than smaller audit
firms (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). Therefore, we include an indicator
for  audits  Big  4  audit  firms.  In  the  regression,  audits  by  noncertified  auditors
and  those  by  Big  4  certified  auditors  are  compared  with  an  omitted  group
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representing audits by non-Big 4 certified auditors. The regression specification,
therefore, attempts to control for potential differences in audit quality between
noncertified, non-Big 4 certified, and Big 4 certified auditors.
In Finland auditor’s report can be signed by more than one responsible auditor,
and,  therefore,  we  include  a  control  variable  indicating  audits  with  more  than
one responsible auditor (TWOorMORE). Auditor independence may be more
likely  to  be  sustained  and/or  audit  effort  increased  if  there  is  more  than  one
signing  auditor  responsible  for  the  audit  engagement.  We  further  include  an
indicator for firms that are legally obligated to have a certified auditor (LAW)
instead of a noncertified auditor based on their size. The justification for this
variable is that firms which voluntarily choose certified auditors may have
lower earnings management incentives than the firms which are legally
obligated to do so. More specifically, the variable LAW indicates whether a firm
is obligated to have its financial statement audited by an auditor with a HTM or
KHT certification by meeting at least two of the three following criteria based on
its financial position in the end of the fiscal year:
(1) total assets > €0.34 million,
(2) gross revenues > €0.68 million, and
(3) number of personnel > 10.
Other control variables included in Model (2) are for financial characteristics
that previous studies have indicated to be important determinants of corporate
earnings  management.  We  include  CFO  defined  as  cash  flow  from  operations
scaled  by  lagged  total  assets,  LogSALES  defined  as  log  of  sales,  and  DTA
defined as total debt scaled by lagged total assets, because cash flows, firm size
and leverage are shown to be associated with the level of discretionary accruals
(e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Reynolds & Francis, 2000). Finally, we control for fixed
industry and year effects on corporate earnings management by including
indicators for firm’s industry classification (based on two-digit SIC codes) and
for fiscal year. The variable definitions are summarized in Table 1.
In the main analysis, we estimate the Model (2) as a pooled (cross-sectional
time-series) ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. To address concerns about
heteroskedasticity and both cross-sectional and time-series dependence of
regression error terms we cluster error terms by firm and year (see Cameron et
al., 2009; Gow et al., 2009).
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3.3  SAMPLE SELECTION
In the regression analysis we use a sample of Finnish private firms drawn from
the  VOITTO  database  of  Suomen  Asiakastieto  Oy,  a  Finnish  credit  rating  and
financial information company. The database includes financial and auditing
data of approximately 100,000 Finnish, mainly limited firms from time-series of
different  length  ranging  from  one  to  five  years  and  covering  fiscal  years  from
1999 to 2006. First, a random sample of 5,000 firms was drawn from the database
by requiring sample firms to have financial statements from five successive
years and fiscal years with 12 moths. This sampling yielded an initial sample of
25,000 firm-years of financial statement data from 1999 to 2006, which was
supplemented with manually collected data on firms’ auditing, industry
classification, company form, and group membership.
In order to obtain our test sample, we impose several restrictions on the
initial dataset. First, we restrict the test sample to private, unconsolidated, and
limited companies. In addition, sufficient data were required to compute total
accruals  and  the  variables  needed  to  estimate  the  Jones  model.  In  order  to
mitigate effects of extreme observations on estimates of discretionary accruals,
all variables needed to estimate the Jones model were truncated by excluding
observations outside the top and bottom percentiles. In addition, at least ten
observations for all two-digit industry-class and year combination is further
required  to  improve  accuracy  of  the  estimates  of  the  Jones  model  (see  e.g.,
Kothari et al., 2005). Finally, requiring non-missing data on all regression
variables  in  Model  (2)  restricts  the  test  sample  to  13,908  observations
representing 3,900 individual firms.
3.4  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the test sample. As can be seen in Table
2,  approximately  one  fifth  (21.1%)  of  all  audits  presented  in  the  sample  have
female auditors as responsible auditors. The sample mean (median) absolute
Jones model discretionary accruals is 10.5 (7.3) percent of (lagged) total assets.
Table 3 presents univariate comparisons by auditor gender (Panel A) and
discretionary  accruals  (Panel  B).  Panel  A  shows  that  the  firms  with  female
auditors are smaller and have higher proportions of absolute total and
discretionary accruals of (lagged) total assets. In addition, female auditors are
less often single responsible signing auditors, less likely to represent Big 4 audit
firms, and more often noncertified auditors. Panel A also separately compares
income increasing and decreasing absolute discretionary accruals by auditor
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been
granted for this version to appear here
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686901111171448). Emerald does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing
Limited.
9
gender. These univariate results show that clients of female auditors report
higher absolute levels of income increasing and decreasing discretionary
accruals, but the difference is more pronounced for income decreasing
discretionary accruals.
The univariate results presented in Panel B show that firms reporting higher
than the sample median discretionary accruals are more likely to have a female
auditor. In addition, these firms are smaller and more levered. Audit reports of
firms reporting higher levels of discretionary accruals are also more often signed
by only one responsible auditor. Panel B also separately compares relative
frequencies of audits by female auditors in subsamples of income increasing and
decreasing absolute discretionary accruals. These univariate comparisons reveal
that the relative frequency of audits by female auditors is significantly higher
among firms reporting higher than the sample median level of income
decreasing discretionary accruals. This difference is not observed for income
increasing discretionary accruals.
In  sum,  the  univariate  results  provide  preliminary  evidence  that  auditor
gender  may  have  an  impact  on  the  level  of  discretionary  accruals.  More
precisely, the results suggest that firms audited by female auditors report higher
levels  of  absolute  discretionary accruals.  However,  separate  analysis  of  income
increasing and decreasing discretionary accruals suggests that this difference is
driven by income decreasing discretionary accruals.
In multivariate regression analysis multicollinearity could bias the coefficient
estimate of the test variable GENDER if this variable correlates highly with any
of the control variables in the Model (2). However, these (untabulated)
correlations do not  exceed ±0.10.  Among the control  variables,  we observe the
largest correlations between LogSALES and LAW (0.776), DTA and CFO
(−0.293), and LogSALES and BIG_4 (0.286), while other correlations are less than
±0.25.  Furthermore,  the  variance  inflation  factors  (VIFs)  of  regressors  in  the
Model  (2)  are  less  than  2.7.  Therefore,  based  on  these  diagnostics  we  conclude
that multicollinearity is not a problem in the multivariate regression analysis
presented in the next section.
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been
granted for this version to appear here
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686901111171448). Emerald does not grant
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing
Limited.
10
Table 1: Variable definitions
TACC Absolute value of total accruals, scaled by lagged total assets;
DACC Absolute value of discretionary accruals from the Jones model, scaled by
by lagged total assets;
CFO Cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets;
LogSALES Log of sales;
DTA Ratio of total debt to total assets;
GENDER An indicator variable equal to 1 in case of a female auditor, 0 otherwise;
NonCERT An indicator variable equal to 1 in case of a non-certified auditor, 0
otherwise;
BIG_4 An indicator variable equal to 1 in case of a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise;
TWOorMORE An indicator variable equal to 1 in case of two or more auditors, 0
otherwise;
LAW An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is legally obligated to choose a
certified (HTM or KHT) auditor, 0 otherwise.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
1st 99th
Continuous variables N Mean SD Percentile Median Percentile
TACC 13,908 0.123 0.112 0.001 0.090 0.520
DACC 13,908 0.105 0.102 0.002 0.073 0.478
DACC (income 7,128 0.103 0.101 0.002 0.072 0.491
DACC (income 6,780 0.106 0.103 0,002 0.074 0.471
CFO 13,908 0.206 0.243 −0.375 0.180 0.941
LogSALES 13,908 6.262 1.480 3.114 6.196 9.967
DTA 13,908 0.516 0.286 0.041 0.498 1.241
Discrete variables: N % − − − −
GENDER (= 1) 2,937 21.1 − − − −
NonCERT (= 1) 3,054 22.0 − − − −
BIG_4 (= 1) 2,433 17.5 − − − −
TWOorMORE (= 1) 859 6.2 − − − −
LAW (= 1) 5,284 38.0 − − − −
This table presents descriptive statistics for the test sample; N denotes the number of firm-year
observations; data covers years from 1999 to 2006; for variable definitions, see Table 1.
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Table 3: Univariate tests
Panel A: Comparisons by auditor gender
Descriptive statistics
GENDER = 1 GENDER = 0
(N = 2,937) (N = 10,971) Comparisons
Continuous variables Mean SD Mean SD Diff. p-value
TACC 0.128 0.120 0.121 0.110 0.008 0.002
DACC 0.112 0.109 0.103 0.100 0.010 0.000
CFO 0.211 0.256 0.205 0.239 0.006 0.252
LogSALES 5.982 1.461 6.336 1.477 −0.354 0.000
DTA 0.511 0.284 0.518 0.286 −0.007 0.216
Discrete variables % % Diff. p-value
GENDER (= 1) 100.0 0.0 − −
NonCERT (= 1) 27.7 20.4 7.3 0.000
BIG_4 (= 1) 13.3 18.6 −5.3 0.000
TWOorMORE (= 1) 8.9 5.4 3.5 0.000
LAW (= 1) 30.2 40.1 −9.9 0.000
GENDER = 1 GENDER = 0
Signed discretionary
l
Mean SD Mean SD Diff. p-value
Income increasing DACC 0.108 0.107 0.102 0.099 0.006 0.062
N 1,544 5,584
Income decreasing DACC 0.117 0.111 0.104 0.100 0.014 0.000
N 1,393 5,387
This table presents additional descriptive statistics and univariate tests; Panel A presents univariate
comparisons  by  auditor  gender;  for the continuous variables, the reported statistics are differences in
means, and the reported p-values are for independent samples’ mean comparison t-test; for the discrete
variables, the reported statistics are differences in relative frequencies, and the reported p-values are for
Pearson’s chi-squared test; N denotes the number of firm-year observations; differences significant at the
10 % level or better are reported with bold characters; data cover years from 1999 to 2006; for variable
definitions, see Table 1.
Table 3 continues on the next page
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Table 3: Continued…
Panel B: Comparisons by discretionary accruals
Descriptive statistics
DACC ≤ 0.072 DACC > 0.072
(N = 6,954) (N = 6,954 ) Comparisons
Continuous variables Mean SD Mean SD Diff. p-value
TACC 0.065 0.055 0.180 0.125 − −
DACC 0.034 0.021 0.175 0.102 − −
CFO 0.204 0.200 0.208 0.279 −0.004 0.391
LogSALES 6.359 1.476 6.165 1.479 0.194 0.000
DTA 0.486 0.286 0.547 0.282 −0.061 0.000
Discrete variables % % Diff. p value
GENDER (= 1) 20.0 22.2 −2.2 0.001
NonCERT (= 1) 20.5 23.4 −2.9 0.000
BIG_4 (= 1) 18.0 17.0 0.9 0.147
TWOorMORE (= 1) 6.7 5.7 1.0 0.012
LAW (= 1) 41.7 34.3 7.5 0.000
Signed discretionary accruals: income increasing DACC
 DACC ≤ 0.072  DACC > 0.072
(N = 3,564 ) (N = 3,564)
% % Diff. p-value
GENDER (= 1) 21.0 22.3 −1.3 0.136
Signed discretionary accruals: income decreasing DACC
DACC ≤ 0.074
(N = 3,390 )
DACC > 0.074
(N = 3,390 )
% % Diff. p-value
GENDER (= 1) 19.1 22.0 −2.9 0.002
This table presents additional descriptive statistics and univariate tests; Panel B presents univariate
comparisons by discretionary accruals; for the continuous variables, the reported statistics are
differences in means, and the reported p-values are for independent samples’ mean comparison t-test;
for discrete variables, the reported statistics are differences in relative frequencies, and the reported p-
values are for Pearson’s chi-squared test; N denotes the number of firm-year observations; differences
significant at the 10 % level or better are reported with bold characters; data cover years from 1999 to
2006; for variable definitions, see Table 1.
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4 Results
4.1  MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 4 presents multivariate regression results. In our analysis, total accruals
and discretionary accruals are regressed on a dummy indicating auditor gender
and several control variables. Columns 1 and 2 present pooled cross-sectional
time-series OLS regressions using the absolute total accruals scaled by lagged
total  assets  (TACC),  and  absolute  discretionary  accruals  from  the  Jones  model
scaled by lagged total assets (DACC) as the dependent variable, respectively.
In the model using TACC as the dependent variable, the coefficient of
GENDER is positive and significant at the five percent level. Furthermore, in the
model  using  DACC  as  the  dependent  variable  the  coefficient  of  GENDER  is
positive and significant at the one percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient
on GENDER indicates that firms audited by female auditors report discretionary
accruals to total assets that are on average 0.58 percent higher compared to firms
audited by male auditors. At the sample mean of total assets (998 TEUR) this
effect equals to 5.79 TEUR, which can be considered economically significant in
the context of private firms. Overall, the significant results for the test variable in
Table 4 suggest that female auditors allow more discretion in accruals
management by means of total and discretional accruals. The observed gender
effect, however, can be driven by income increasing or decreasing earnings
management..
With respect to control variables related to auditing, the coefficients of
NonCERT and BIG_4 are consistently positive and significant in Table 4. The
negative and significant coefficients of LAW and LogSALES in Column 2
suggest that discretionary accruals as a proportion of total assets decreases with
an increase in firm size. This result is consistent with prior findings in Reynolds
& Francis (2000). In contrast to prior findings, however, positive and significant
coefficients of CFO and DTA suggest that discretionary accruals as a proportion
of total assets increases with operating cash flows and financial leverage
(Dechow et al., 1995; Becker et al., 1998).
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Table 4: Multivariate regression results
Independent Dependent variable
variables Prediction Column 1: TACC Column 2: DACC
Intercept ? 0.0807 0.0530
(.) (0.013)
GENDER ? 0.0044 0.0058
(0.028) (0.001)
NonCERT + 0.0065 0.0050
(0.009) (0.094)
BIG_4 − 0.0116 0.0072
(0.000) (0.000)
TWOorMORE ? 0.0044 0.0017
(0.391) (0.738)
LAW ? −0.0081 −0.0115
(0.000) (0.000)
CFO ? 0.1173 0.0237
(0.000) (0.000)
LogSALES ? −0.0059 −0.0023
(0.000) (0.030)
DTA ? 0.0975 0.0554
(0.000) (0.000)
Year controls Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes
N 14,482 13,908
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.058
This table presents the main regression results; columns 1 and 2 present pooled OLS
regressions with total absolute accruals (TACC), and Jones model discretionary accruals
(DACC) as the dependent variable, respectively; N denotes  the  number  of  firm-year
observations per model; p-values of t statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based on
standard errors clustered by firm and year; coefficients significant at the 10 % level or better
based on two-tailed test  are reported with bold  characters;  data cover  years  from 1999 to
2006; for variable definitions, see Table 1.
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The  results  presented  in  Table  4  are  based  on  absolute  values  of  income
increasing and decreasing discretionary accruals. To gain further insight on
whether the results conserning the gender-effect are driven by either income
increasing or decreasing earnings management we ran regressions separately for
subsamples of income increasing and decreasing absolute discretionary accruals.
These models are presented in Table 5. In the model for income decreasing
(increasing) DACC, the coefficient of GENDER is positive and significant at the
five percent  level  (insignificant).  Therefore,  the  results  on GENDER seem to be
driven by income decreasing earnings management. This finding suggests that
while  male  and  female  auditors  both  restrict  overstatement  of  earnings  by
private firms, female auditors being more conservative are less restrictive or
contribute to understatement of these earnings.
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Table 5: Signed discretionary accruals
Dependent variable
Column 1: Column 2:
Independent variables income decreasing DACC income increasing DACC
Intercept −0.0234 0.0658
(0.066) (0.000)
GENDER 0.0045 0.0018
(0.010) (0.612)
NonCERT 0.0027 0.0037
(0.372) (0.122)
BIG_4 0.0114 0.0021
(0.000) (0.268)
TWOorMORE 0.0192 −0.0193
(0.016) (0.000)
LAW −0.0023 −0.0164
(0.530) (0.000)
CFO 0.1981 −0.1667
(0.000) (0.000)
LogSALES −0.0069 0.0018
(0.000) (0.145)
DTA 0.1082 −0.0112
(0.000) (0.109)
Year controls Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes
N 6,780 7128
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.152
This table presents additional sensitivity analysis; columns  1  and  2  presents  pooled  OLS
regressions separately on subsamples of income decreasing and income increasing absolute
discretionary accruals (DACC), respectively; N denotes the number of firm-year observations
per model; p-values of t statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based on standard
errors clustered by firm and year; coefficients significant at the 10 % level or better based on
two-tailed test  are reported with bold  characters;  data cover  years  from 1999 to  2006; for
variable definitions, see Table 1.
The  results  presented  in  Table  4  are  based  on  absolute  values  of  income
increasing and decreasing discretionary accruals. To gain further insight on
whether the results conserning the gender-effect are driven by either income
increasing or decreasing earnings management we ran regressions separately for
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subsamples of income increasing and decreasing absolute discretionary accruals.
These models are presented in Table 5. In the model for income decreasing
(increasing) DACC, the coefficient of GENDER is positive and significant at the
five percent  level  (insignificant).  Therefore,  the  results  on GENDER seem to be
driven by income decreasing earnings management. This finding suggests that
while  male  and  female  auditors  both  restrict  overstatement  of  earnings  by
private firms, female auditors being more conservative are less restrictive or
contribute to understatement of these earnings.
4.2  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Because of the panel nature of the data, it is appropriate to test whether time-
constant firm-effects (i.e., firm heterogeneity) should be further controlled in the
multivariate analysis by means of the appropriate panel data estimation method.
The specification tests (i.e., Hausman contrast test and Preusch-Pagan LM test)
not  reported  in  detail  reject  the  consistency  of  the  pooled  and  random  effects
models,  and  suggest  that  fixed  effects  (within)  method  is  appropriate  for
estimation of the Model (2) from the data.
Accordingly,  we  run  fixed  effects  (within)  regressions  for  the  total  sample
and  separately  for  subsamples  of  income  increasing  and  decreasing  absolute
discretionary accruals. The coefficient on GENDER, however, is insignificant in
all models. This may imply that pooled OLS results with respect to GENDER are
biased  because  of  an  omitted  variable  problem  caused  by  confounding  firm-
effects. An alternative explanation is that the fixed effects (within) method, that
makes statistical inference based on time-series variation of the data, lacks
efficiency in detecting gender effects since the variability of GENDER is mostly
cross-sectional  instead  of  temporal  in  the  data.  Therefore,  we  draw  the
conclusions of this study based on pooled OLS results.
To check whether the results are sensitive to the choice of an earnings
management measure we estimate the Model (2) using modified Jones model
discretionary accruals (i.e., the modification by Dechow et al., 1995) as an
alternative measure for earnings management. The difference between the Jones
model  and  the  modified  Jones  model  is  that  the  latter  attributes  the  entire
change in receivables to earnings management. According to unreported
regressions, the results are unaffected by the use of this alternative discretionary
accruals measure. In the model with DACC (income decreasing DACC) as the
dependent variable, the coefficient of GENDER is positive and significant at the
one (five) percent level.
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One concern regarding the research design applied in this study is the self-
selection problem. Because sample firms self-select their auditors, auditor choice
indicator GENDER is likely to be endogenous in the multivariate regression
model, and therefore, can have a biased coefficient estimate in regressions.
Univariate results presented in Table 2 indicate a self-selection problem since
firms in the sub-samples of female and male auditors systematically differ in
various firm-specific characteristics. Consequently, significant coefficient of
GENDER in regressions can be attributable to confounding firm characteristics
rather than auditor’s gender.
To  check  whether  the  main  results  are  affected  by  potential  endogeneity  of
the test variable, we conduct propensity score matching analysis (Heckman,
1979;  Rosenbaum  &  Rubin,  1983).  First,  for  every  year  and  industry  (based  on
two-digit SIC) combination we match firms having female auditors with those
having male auditors based on predicted probabilities obtained from the
following pooled auditor selection probit model1:
GENDERit = λ0 + λ1 NonCERTit + λ2 BIG_4it + λ3 TWOorMOREit + λ4 LAWit + λ5
CFOit + λ6 LogSALESit + λ7 LogSALES2it + λ8 LogSALES3it + λ9 DTAit + λ10 ROAit
+ εit                                                                                                                                    (3)
The  auditor  selection  model  includes  GENDER  as  the  dependent  variable.
Independent variables in the Model (4) include all control variables from the
Model (2), higher order terms for LogSALES, and an additional control variable
ROA,  defined  as  operating  income  scaled  by  lagged  total  assets.  ROA  is
included in order to eliminate differences in profitability between matched firms
(see Kothari et al., 2005). Next, we estimate Model (2) for the matched
subsample drawn from the data. In the regression with DACC (income
decreasing DACC) as the dependent variable and matched sample size of 5,290
(2,542) observations, the coefficient of GENDER is positive and significant at the
0.1 (five) percent level. In sum, the consideration of the potential endogeneity
problem related to the test variable GENDER does not change the conclusion
that female auditors seem to contribute to income decreasing earnings
management of private firms.
To check whether there are systematic differences in the observed gender-
effect between groups of non-certified, non-Big 4 certified and Big 4 certified
auditors, we run regressions by interacting GENDER with NonCERT and BIG 4.
1 Specifically, matched test sample is formed by matching observations of female auditor with those
of male auditor within caliper of 0.01 of predicted probability with nearest neighbour without
replacement.
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However,  we  do  not  observe  any  significant  interaction  effects  in  these
regressions either  by using DACC or  income increasing and decreasing DACC
as the dependent variable. Based on these results, we conclude that there are no
significant differences in observed gender-effect between groups of non-certified,
non-Big 4 certified and Big 4 certified auditors.
The  test  variable  GENDER  codes  observations  (N  =  211)  of  firms  with
auditor’s report signed by female and male auditors as having the value of one.
Therefore, we ran regressions by excluding these observations to check whether
the results are sensitive to these observations. Untabulated regressions indicate
that the results and the conclusions about the gender-effect are unaffected by
this exclusion.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  whether  auditor  gender  has  an
impact on the magnitude of corporate earnings management in small and
medium-sized private Finnish firms. Although the earnings management
literature, gender literature and auditing literature are all extensive with points
of contact with many other disciplines, we are not aware of any prior studies on
the effect that auditor gender has on actual earnings management in private
firms. There have been some attempts to investigate the impact that gender has
on earnings management. Some studies have used surveys targeted at
accounting students to investigate whether gender and national origin have an
impact on attitudes towards common methods to manage earnings. The results
indicate  that  gender  is  not  a  decisive  issue  in  this  context.  Others  investigate
actual earnings management behavior and find that earnings quality is
positively associated with gender diversity in corporate management.  The role
that female auditors play in the auditing profession has been given an increasing
amount  of  attention,  too.  The results  imply that  female  auditors  are  more risk-
averse in auditor judgement, perform better in moral development.
Our results concerning gender differences in audit practices are twofold. First,
when  we  regress  the  absolute  (unsigned)  earnings  management  on  a  gender
dummy  and  a  set  of  control  variables,  we  find  that  female  auditors  allow  for
more discretion in income reporting than their male colleagues. When the
analysis is conducted separately for sub-samples of income increasing and
income decreasing discretionary accruals, the results suggest that female
auditors are more conservative than their male colleagues.
This study contributes to previous literature on gender and earnings quality
by documenting a positive association between auditor gender and actual
earnings  quality.  Auditors  are  expected  to  be  a  homogenous  group  of
professionals because they are obligated to follow equal auditing standards in
their profession. Conversely, there is lot more heterogeneity allowed in the level
of profession between firm managers, including male and female. The results of
this  study  show  that  gender  diversity  is  evident  also  in  a  more  homogenous
group of professionals.
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These results may also have practical implications. When selecting auditors,
management should pay attention also to the gender of the auditor. It may also
be useful for stakeholders to pay attention to the gender of the auditors that they
engage or the gender distribution of the audit team. Our results also imply that
gender diversity in the auditing profession may improve the quality of financial
statements overall.
One  of  the  main  limitations  of  this  study  is  that  it  has  been  has  been
conducted  by  using  data  from  one  country.  In  Finland,  women  are  very  equal
with men in all branches of life. They are also equally well, in some industries on
average even better, educated than their male colleagues. However, since it is
commonly known that the role of females in the society varies from one country
to the next more research is needed in different social environments.
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